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Abstract 
 
We propose a new channel through which expropriation risk reduces capital allocation 
efficiency and decreases firm growth. We build an agency model of corporate disclosure 
when companies face risks of expropriation. The model predicts that in countries with 
insecure property rights, corporations mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing 
transparency. We test this channel by employing a difference-in-difference approach. Using a 
panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 countries, we find that transparency of companies prone 
to expropriation is lower in countries with insecure property rights. The reduced transparency 
has an adverse effect on the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate growth.  
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Introduction  
In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the 
violence of their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great part of their 
[capital] stock. 
Adam Smith (1776).  
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
 
Why are some nations rich and others poor? Why have some poor countries managed to 
catch up with rich countries within one generation’s lifetime, and others have lagged behind 
even further? Since Adam Smith, economists have emphasized the importance of institutions. 
However, only in recent years economists have begun to measure specific institutions and 
tried to identify the institutions that are most critical for economic growth. For example, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) distinguish between property rights and contract enforcement 
and show that the protection of property rights is by far more important for growth. However, 
it is hard to identify the causal effect of property rights on growth. While the richer countries 
tend to have stronger property rights, the direction of causality is not clear, and the cross-
country regressions cannot resolve the obvious methodological problems.1  
In this paper, we study the effect of property rights on growth at the microeconomic level, 
rather than at the country level. We suggest a channel through which property rights 
influence the behavior of individual firms: we show that poor protection of property rights 
can result in lower corporate transparency which, in turn, reduces the efficiency of capital 
allocation and growth of firms. In order to address the endogeneity issues caused by omitted 
variables and reverse causality, we apply the difference-in-difference approach. In particular, 
we study the behavior of firms in industries that are easier to expropriate in countries where 
expropriation is more likely. 
We argue that in countries with weak property rights, governments are more inclined to 
expropriate rents from certain industries, e.g., natural resource industries or industries with a 
low share of skilled labor. This makes the firms operating in these sectors especially 
vulnerable to expropriation and provides them with incentives to withhold and manipulate 
information about their performance. The resulting lower transparency leads to worse capital 
allocation and slower economic growth.   
                                                 
1 There is a notable exception of Acemoglu et al. (2001) who instrument institutions by the European settler 
mortality and show that institutions have an impact on the long-run economic performance. 
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We propose a theory based on the idea that corporate profits in expropriation-sensitive 
industries represent rents that are relatively easy for governments to capture. The theory also 
takes into account the agency conflict between managers and minority shareholders.  Firms 
in expropriation-sensitive industries face a trade-off. On one hand, in order to attract external 
capital, they need to be transparent. On the other hand, higher transparency involves greater 
risks of expropriation by the government.2 As argued by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and 
Stulz (2005), more transparent corporate profits can attract various forms of government 
expropriation, such as the solicitation of bribes, overregulation, confiscatory taxation, and the 
outright seizure of firm assets. Transparency would therefore be lower in industries that are 
more vulnerable to expropriation, particularly in countries that have poor protection of 
property rights. 
In order to test this prediction, we depart from the analysis of country-level data and use 
microeconomic data, a panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 countries. We apply the approach 
introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who studied the effect of financial dependence on 
growth.3 We test whether the firms that are more vulnerable to government expropriation 
have lower transparency levels in countries with higher risks of expropriation. Since we 
include firm and year fixed effects in all our regressions, we essentially focus on a within-
country variation in opacity induced by government rent seeking (firm fixed effects naturally 
absorb country fixed effects and industry fixed effects). This difference-in-difference 
approach mitigates the bias induced by omitted variables and model misspecification. 
Moreover, this method makes it easier to differentiate the proposed transparency channel 
from other explanations for why expropriation risk affects firm transparency. 
In order to conduct this test, we need proxies for vulnerability to expropriation. We use 
three different measures. First, based on substantial anecdotal and statistical evidence, we 
claim that firms in natural resource sectors, such as the oil sector, are at a greater risk of 
expropriation than other companies, especially when the oil prices are high. We also extend 
this logic one step further and construct a continuous (rather than binary) measure of oil 
dependence. We assume that firms whose profits are correlated with oil prices are also more 
                                                 
2 Hereinafter, we consider expropriation by a predatory government. However, our predictions do not change if 
expropriation is conducted by competitors or other private entities. 
3 Rajan and Zingales (1998) ranked industries by the degree of financial dependence (using data from the U.S., 
arguably the most developed financial market) and then studied the growth of industries in different countries 
depending on countries’ financial development and industries’ financial dependence. 
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prone to expropriation. We calculate the oil dependence for U.S. firms and then use the 
derived data on the oil dependence in the regressions for the firms outside the U.S.4 We also 
repeat the analysis using sensitivities to other commodity prices. The second measure of the 
sensitivity to expropriation is the intensity of human capital. We argue that governments are 
less likely to expropriate from industries that employ more high-skilled workers (whose 
human capital is inalienable). We use U.S. industry data to measure the proportion of 
college-educated workers and then transplant the measure to other countries (excluding the 
U.S. from further tests). The third measure is based on the actual number of expropriation 
instances observed in each industry (we exclude the expropriated firms from the regressions). 
We use these measures separately and as a unified index constructed using the Principal 
Component Analysis. 
Fearing expropriation by the government, firms can use different strategies to manipulate 
the reported income. For example, Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) document that, in the U.S., 
oil producers underreport profitability by using negative accruals and write down the values 
of aging or unwanted oil fields to decrease litigation risks.  As the first measure of income 
transparency, we use the amount of negative accruals. We also construct other measures of 
opacity. The measures are based on accounting and financial data; thus they do not reflect the 
exact mechanisms employed by managers, but rather they can be viewed as aggregate 
opacity induced by withholding and the manipulation of information. The second measure, 
accounting opacity, is based on the absolute value of discretionary accruals. It reflects the 
quality of reported earnings in firms’ financial statements since managers often manage 
reported earnings to hide or obscure information (Shivakumar (2000) and Chaney et al. 
(2010)). Alternatively, the managers can manipulate the precision of information through 
stock market trading (Aggarwal and Wu (2006)). For example, managers can depress stock 
prices of a profitable company by placing a large sell order of the company’s stock. To 
reflect these strategies, we consider insider opacity as the third measure. It is based on a 
dynamic relationship between stock returns and the trading volume in the stock market, and 
it can be viewed as the degree of informational asymmetry associated with a company. 
Furthermore, managers can obfuscate a company’s true prospects by passing false 
                                                 
4 Excluding U.S. firms precludes scenarios in which industries in other countries endogenously adjust their 
business structure as a response to expropriation risks.  
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information to investors and market professionals making stock prices less informative. The 
last measure, informational opacity, tracks the aggregate amount of firm-specific information 
contained in stock prices. It is proxied by the degree of asynchronicity of the stock price with 
the stock market index.  
Our main empirical finding is that more expropriation-susceptible industries (firms whose 
profits are highly correlated with oil prices and firms in industries that employ fewer skilled 
workers) are less transparent in countries with greater risks of government expropriation. 
Using the sample of oil companies, we illustrate this difference-in-difference method in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Differential opacity of oil and gas extraction firms relative to other firms plotted against 
country risk of expropriation. This graph plots accounting opacity of oil and gas companies (SIC = 13), 
accounting opacity of non-oil and gas companies, and differential accounting opacity. Differential opacity is the 
difference between median opacity (across firms and years from 1995 through 2007) of oil and gas firms and 
the median aggregate opacity of all other firms. Accounting opacity is defined as the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Countries are divided in five groups: (i) risk of expropriation is from 1.3 through 2.1, (ii) 
risk of expropriation is from 2.2 through 3.0, (iii) risk of expropriation is from 3.1 through 4.2, (iv) risk of 
expropriation is from 4.3 through 7.6. As the risk of expropriation increases, the difference in opacity between 
the two groups of firms becomes larger. The correlation coefficient between differential opacity and 
expropriation risk is 0.59 with p-value = 0.00. 
 
There is a clear association between government risk of expropriation and corporate 
transparency. In Figure 1, we plot country-level opacity (based on the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals) of oil and gas firms versus country risk of expropriation index (the 
risk of expropriation is defined later). The differential opacity is calculated as country median 
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opacity of firms that belong to the oil and gas industry minus country median opacity of all 
other firms. In most countries (68% of the sample), firms subject to greater risks of 
expropriation are more opaque relative to all other firms (differential opacity is positive). 
More interestingly, differential opacity is generally larger in countries with a greater risk of 
expropriation. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.59 with p-value 
0.00.  
Using the triple-difference approach, we also document that the adverse effects of 
expropriation on transparency of oil companies are larger during periods of high oil prices, 
the periods when governments can capture larger rents. This triple-difference result is 
summarized in Figure 2, which depicts how the difference in opacity between oil firms and 
other firms (differential opacity) in high-expropriation risk countries evolves as oil prices 
fluctuate.  
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the triple-difference approach: differential opacity and oil prices. This graph plots 
differential accounting opacity of oil and gas companies and oil prices. Differential opacity is the difference 
between median opacity (across all firms and years from 1980 through 2007) of oil and gas firms and the 
median aggregate opacity of all other firms. Opacity is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Oil prices 
are from the BP statistics, and they are expressed in 2000 dollars per barrel. As oil price increases, the 
differential opacity becomes larger. The correlation coefficient between differential opacity and oil price is 0.62 
with p-value = 0.00. The graph utilizes a longer time period (1980-2007) than the time period used in the 
empirical analysis (1995-2007). 
 
It is evident that differential opacity becomes larger during the periods of high oil prices. 
For example, when oil prices were low in 1988 (oil price = 19 dollars per barrel), oil 
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companies were more transparent than other companies. In contrast, oil companies became 
much more opaque (relative to other firms) in 2007 when oil prices reached record-high 
levels of 55 dollars per barrel. The correlation coefficient between differential opacity and oil 
price is rather large, 0.62, with p-value of 0.00. Our results do not pertain to oil and gas 
companies only. We obtain similar results for other natural resource sectors, such as metals. 
Can our results be driven by managerial diversion rather than by the risk of expropriation 
by the government? For example, firms in expropriation-prone industries located in countries 
with a high expropriation risk can also have worse governance. Moreover, in such countries, 
firm insiders may bribe state officials to facilitate diversion. If investors are poorly protected, 
top management can collude with politicians and divert company resources at the expense of 
minority investors. This type of diversion is usually accompanied by opacity. We show that 
our results are driven by the described agency problems. First, our regressions include firm 
fixed effects that control for unobserved firm characteristics. Second, we use time-series data 
on firm ownership and explicitly control for the ownership wedge – the difference between 
control rights and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. Extant literature points out that 
greater separation of ownership and control makes large shareholders more entrenched and 
increases their incentives to divert firm resources. Third, we control for the need for external 
financing which is shown to mitigate the agency conflict. Fourth, we condition our test on 
government ownership. We assume that a government has weaker incentives to expropriate 
firm profits if the government holds a large stake in the firm.  
We turn our attention from the causes of lower transparency to its implications for 
capital market efficiency and growth. There is growing empirical evidence that more 
developed and more information-rich financial markets are a necessary condition for efficient 
capital allocation (Wurgler (2000), Kumar and Langberg (2009), Claessens et al. (2010)). As 
a measure of capital allocation efficiency, we use the elasticity of firm investment with 
respect to value. Consistent with our arguments, capital allocation is indeed less efficient in 
expropriation-sensitive industries located in countries with more predatory governments. We 
also show that firms in such industries grow slower. In the empirical tests, we differentiate 
between growth reduction resulting from greater opacity (triggered by state predatory 
policies) and growth reduction caused by direct effects of expropriation. It turns out that the 
drop in firm growth caused by opacity is comparable to the drop resulting from expropriation 
risk directly. Specifically, a two-standard deviations increase in the risk of expropriation (the 
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increase in the risk equivalent to the move from Norway to Venezuela) reduces firm growth 
by about 3.1% directly and by a comparable amount of 2.3% resulting from increased 
opacity.   
To sum up, our contribution to the literature on the effect of property rights of growth 
(discussed in Section V) is as follows. First, as we use a panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 
countries for the period of 1995-2007, we are able to employ difference-in-difference 
approach, taking advantage of the risk of expropriation between countries, and of the 
variation of vulnerability to expropriation across industries (and in some specifications, 
across time). Second, we focus on a specific channel of the effect of expropriation risk on 
growth: we show that expropriation risk reduces corporate transparency, which in turn has an 
adverse effect on the efficiency of capital allocation and on the growth of firms. Our findings 
are also relevant to the debate about the “resource curse”, the fact that resource abundance 
negatively affects economic growth in standard growth regressions. Unlike the existing 
literature, which is mostly based on cross-country comparisons, we use a panel of firms 
spanning many years. We examine the effect of government expropriation on corporate 
transparency, capital allocation, and growth in resource industries at the microeconomic level 
controlling for agency problem, firm, and time-specific effects.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents an agency model of disclosure with the 
threat of government’s expropriation and derives empirical predictions. In Section II, we 
describe empirical methodology, the data, and the variables. Our results are presented in 
Section III. In Section IV, we present alternative interpretations of our findings and provide 
robustness checks. In Section V, we discuss the related literature. Section VI concludes.  
  
I. A Model of Disclosure with Government Expropriation  
To provide the basic intuition for our arguments, we present a model of disclosure under 
a threat of government expropriation. We consider an asymmetric information game between 
a firm, outside shareholders, and a government with endogenous corporate disclosure, 
diversion of funds by insiders (managers or controlling shareholders), and government 
expropriation. We show that in equilibrium, the less productive firms choose to hide their 
earnings, while the more productive firms disclose them. We study the comparative statics 
with regard to exogenous changes in property right protection. We show that the equilibrium 
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levels of corporate opacity and managerial diversion are higher when property rights are 
weak. We also discuss alternative explanations for the results. 
 
A. The Setting 
We consider a model of corporate disclosure along the lines of Verrecchia (2001) and add 
elements of expropriation by the government and diversion of funds by insiders (managers or 
controlling shareholders) as in Stulz (2005). We assume that there is a continuum of firms, 
outside investors, and a government. Each firm has a project that generates earnings . The 
earnings  are distributed on  ,  with a cumulative distribution function F() and a 
probability density function f() = F′(). In what follows, we assume that the distribution is 
sufficiently close to the uniform distribution, in particular that   y dfyFy   )()(/1  
increases in y.5  
Each firm needs to raise K dollars to finance a project (K is exogenous). In order to do 
this, the firm sells  shares to the outside investors. As the stock price is endogenous, so is . 
Firms act in the interest of the original shareholders (whom we call the firm’s “insiders” or 
just the “firm”); they receive (1 ) percent of the profit. 
Each firm may disclose its earnings at a fixed cost C. This cost covers the resources spent 
to verify the earnings to the outsiders, for example, the cost of hiring auditors. Investors are 
perfectly competitive, their time preference is normalized to 1, and they price firms’ shares 
based on all relevant information. We denote the investors’ beliefs about the earnings as . If 
the earnings are disclosed, the investors know for sure that the earnings are  = . If the 
earnings are not disclosed, the investors base their decisions on the equilibrium beliefs about 
which firms disclose and which do not. In this case, we denote the earnings of an average 
non-disclosing firm as  = ˆ . For example, if investors know that all firms with  > * 
disclose and others hide, the average firm that does not disclose should have earnings equal 
to 
                                                 
5 This condition is tantamount to assuming that the average earnings, given they are below some value y, 
  y dfyF   )()(/1 , increase slower, than y itself. Technically, this assumption is satisfied whenever the 
distribution is sufficiently close to the uniform distribution, and the density function does not have spikes.  
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The firm’s insiders choose a share s of profits to divert. Following Stulz (2005), we assume 
that the cost of diversion is bs2/2, where b is a proxy for protection of external investors 
from stealing by insiders. The parameter b can be both firm- and country-specific; larger 
values of b can represent better country-level investor protection and firm-level internal 
governance mechanisms.6  
In addition to the diversion by insiders, there is also expropriation by the government. 
The government obtains the same information as external investors. Government can 
expropriate a share x of the post-diversion profits (1 s) at a cost x2(1 s)/(2P), where P is 
the proxy for the degree of predation for a given industry in a country, and s is the share of 
the earnings diverted by the insiders. The index P is high in industries and countries in which 
it is easier to expropriate firms’ profits. This is an exogenous variable related to the 
“technology of predation” (including the political and bureaucratic costs of expropriation); it 
is independent of the firm’s own strategy and/or performance. For example, in high-
technology industries based on (inalienable) human capital, expropriation is costly (P is low); 
in natural resource industries, rents are easier to capture (P is high). Similarly, in countries 
and industries where property rights are better protected, predation is lower (P is low).7  
The government’s ex ante payoff is   
                 .)(2/11 2   dfPsxsx               (2) 
In (2), )(  is the expected value of the firm’s value: if the earnings are disclosed then () 
= ; if the earnings are not disclosed then () = ˆ ; x() is the level of expropriation for a 
                                                 
6 The results of our model do not change if we model country legal environment and the quality of firm 
governance separately. 
7 The functional form for the cost of expropriation is similar to the one in Stulz (2005) with an important 
difference. While Stulz assumes for simplicity that the cost of government expropriation is x2(1  s)/(2P), i.e., 
it is proportional to the firm’s profits, we assume that the government can allocate its expropriation efforts 
across firms and can therefore focus on expropriating the firms that are more profitable than others. This is the 
major asymmetry between the diversion by insiders (who can only steal from their own firms) and the 
government (that can choose which firms to expropriate). We therefore follow Stulz’s cost function for 
diversion by insiders but change the government’s cost function. 
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given level of expected earnings . In equilibrium, the government will set a higher x() for 
more profitable firms.8 
We assume that P is sufficiently low so that the level of expropriation x is always 
between 0 and 1. We also assume that the technical costs of disclosure are sufficiently low. It 
allows us to focus on the most interesting equilibrium, where some firms disclose in 
equilibrium and others do not.  
 
B. Timing and Payoffs 
The timing is as follows. In period 0, firms learn their profits  and choose whether to 
disclose. In period 1, investors observe the disclosed profits and buy the issued equity. In 
period 2, the insiders choose the extent of diversion s. Then the government observes the 
disclosed profits and chooses the level of expropriation x. In period 3, firms pay out 
dividends and get liquidated. We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium (given the 
assumptions above, there is a unique equilibrium). 
The government’s objective function can be decomposed into payoffs received from 
individual firms. For a given firm, the government maximizes   
UG =  x(1 s) –  x2(1 s) / (2P)   ,                   
where  is either the true earnings  = , if the earnings are disclosed, or  = ˆ  if the 
earnings are not disclosed.  
The investors are perfectly competitive. Their participation constraint is therefore 
binding,   
                    (1 x) (1 s)  = K  .      
Given the decisions by investors and by the government, the firm’s insiders choose s to 
maximize  
UF = – bs2  / 2 + s + (1 ) (1 x) (1 s)  .  
  
                                                 
8 We do not differentiate between expropriation and taxation. Therefore, our model shares similar features with 
tax sheltering and diversion models of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et al. (2007) that examine how 
firm governance interacts with taxes. In the empirical analysis, however, we explicitly control for measures of 
corporate tax rate and the assessment of the fairness of the tax system. 
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C. Diversion and Expropriation in Equilibrium 
We solve for the equilibrium given the disclosure decision using backward induction. We 
first obtain the level of expropriation by the government x, then profit diversion s, and then 
pricing of the shares by the investors.  
The objective function for the government implies that the government chooses x = P. 
Given the expected earnings , the  equilibrium level of expropriation x and diversion by 
insiders s, the investors value the firm at (1  x)(1  s). Therefore, in order to raise K 
dollars, the investors require the following per cent of the firm’s shares: 
 )1)(1( sx
K   .    
Let us now solve for the optimal level of diversion. The first order condition implies 
s = ( (1 x) + x) / b . 
As in Stulz (2005), the level of diversion is higher whenever (i) the level of investor 
protection is lower (b is high) (ii) government expropriates a larger fraction of cash flows (x 
is high), and (iii) the insider ownership is lower ( is high). The two equations above imply 
the quadratic equation for the equilibrium level of diversion by insiders s, 
x
s
Kbs 

1
/   .                    (3) 
This quadratic equation has two roots; it is easy to check that only the lower one corresponds 
to the Nash equilibrium:  
 
b
bKxbxb
s
2
/4
1
2    .    
Let us now rewrite the firm’s insider payoff as 
UF = u(,x)  , 
where  
       
b
bKbKxbxbxbbbsbxu
4
24
2
1
22
11),(
22
2                 
and x = P. 
The equation above implies that the payoff to insiders u and the level of profit diversion 
in equilibrium s are negatively correlated (u increases in 1 s). This result directly follows 
from the fact that investors are perfectly competitive and receive zero rent. Therefore, the 
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insiders eventually bear the costs of their own inability to commit to not stealing from the 
shareholders. Their incentives to steal from the shareholders in turn depend on the 
expropriation by the government. If the insiders expect predation P to be high, they are 
interested in higher diversion from the shareholders. The following lemma describes the 
properties of the equilibrium.  
Lemma 1. Given the disclosure decision and the respective earnings expectations  by 
investors and government, the equilibrium has the following comparative statics:  
 higher predation P results in higher profit diversion s and lower payoff to the 
firm’s insider UF. 
 the sensitivity of the insider’s payoff to predation P decreases with the earnings 
expectations :  0),(
2

 PU
P
F . 
 
D.  Equilibrium Level of Disclosure and Comparative Statics 
Let us now describe the firms’ disclosure decisions. We consider the equilibrium where 
there exists such   ,*  that all firms with  > * disclose and others hide. As we show 
later, under certain technical assumptions this equilibrium exists and there are no other 
equilibria. For the firms that disclose, the government and the investors know the true 
earnings  = . For the firms that hide, the government and the investors expect  = ˆ (*), 
where ˆ (*) is defined in (1).  
The firms that disclose receive the payoff – C + u(,P). The firms that do not disclose 
receive u( ˆ (*),P ˆ (*)). To understand the disclosure decision, let us introduce the 
“return to disclosure” function, 
(,P)  ≡  u(,P) – u( ˆ (),P ˆ ())   .    
The equilibrium level of earnings * at which firms are indifferent between disclosing and 
hiding solves the following equation: 
(*,P) = C  .                         (4) 
Our main result is described in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 1. Assume that the distribution of returns  is such that (i) - ˆ () is an 
increasing function of ; (ii) the level of predation is sufficiently low so that for all   , , 
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min bKbbP ; (iii) ( ,P) < C and (  ,P) > C. In this case, there exists a 
unique equilibrium with the following properties. There is such   ,*  that * solves 
equation (4), all firms with  > * disclose and all firms with   * hide. The equilibrium 
has the following comparative statics: the level of opacity F(*) increases in predation P and 
cost of disclosure C, and decreases in external financing needs K. Profit diversion by 
insiders s is higher in firms that hide. An increase in predation P results in an increase in 
diversion by insiders. 
The proof directly follows from equation (4) and its properties described in Lemma 1. 
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the returns to disclosure (,P) increase in earnings 
 and decrease in predation P (as illustrated using the model simulation in Figure 3). As the 
returns to disclosure increase in , the firms with high earnings disclose in equilibrium and 
the firms with lower earnings hide. As the returns to disclosure decrease in P, the higher the 
predation P, the greater the cutoff level of earnings *, hence fewer firms disclose.  
The role of assumptions of Proposition 1 is as follows. Assumption (iii) makes sure that 
in equilibrium some firms disclose and others hide. If the cost of disclosure C were higher 
than (  ,P), then all firms would hide; if C were below ( ,P)  then all firms would 
disclose. Assumption (ii) guarantees that every firm can sell equity (i.e., equation (3) has a 
solution) and that the effect of predation is not too strong so that returns to disclosure 
increase in . If (ii) did not hold, then returns for disclosure would be higher for firms with 
lower earnings. We would then have to allow for the possibility that companies hide part of 
earnings. The model would become more involved but the equilibrium would still be 
characterized by the monotonicity of disclosure with regard to true earnings. Assumption (i) 
is a technical assumption that ensures that the returns to disclosure are monotonic for all 
  , . 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of equation (4). This graph plots returns to disclosure (,P), defined as 
the difference in firms’ payoffs with and without disclosure, as a function of firms’ earnings for  for parameter 
values b = 10, K = 0.5, C = 0.1,  uniformly distributed on [1,2], and two levels of predation: low P = 0.025 and 
high P = 0.05. When the risk of expropriation by the government is low (P = 0.025), firms with earnings from  
to * = 1.54 hide and firms with earnings above * disclose their earnings. When the risk of expropriation 
increases to P = 0.05, the level of opacity increases: now only firms with earnings  > *′=1.64 disclose while 
firms with earnings from  to *′ hide.  
 
To sum up, our model implies that controlling for the need for external financing (K) and 
the level of protection of outside investors (b), higher predation results in lower transparency 
and higher diversion of profit by insiders. The latter, in turn, implies destruction of value 
because diversion is socially wasteful (the cost of bs2/2 is a deadweight loss).  
Moreover, lower transparency also implies lower efficiency of the capital market. Since 
all of the non-disclosing firms (with earnings  < *) are pooled together, their valuation ( ˆ ) 
does not depend in their true earnings. The stock market, in this case, is less efficient because 
some positive-NPV projects for these firms are not financed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
return to 
disclosure 
 low predation 
high predation 
   π*   π*’           π  
C 
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II. Data, Empirical Methodology, and Variables 
 
A. Data 
Our sample comes from the OSIRIS Industrial and OSIRIS Ownership databases.9 To be 
present in the sample, a company is required to have time-series accounting and ownership 
variables. After data cleaning, the unbalanced sample consists of 16,240 firms (79,817 firm-
years) from 84 countries spanning the time period from 1995 through 2007.10 For some 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Oman), we collected firm data by hand using 
information from local stock exchanges.  
 
B. Empirical Specifications   
 
B.1. Opacity regressions. To test our hypotheses, we apply the difference-in-difference 
methodology similar to that in Rajan and Zingales (1998). We use a panel of firm-country-
year data to estimate regressions of firm opacity (Y) run on the double interaction term of 
industry sensitivity to expropriation (EXPR_SENS) with country risk of expropriation 
(EXPR_RISK), and control variables (CONTROLS), 
c
ti
c
ti
c
ttjti
c
ti CONTROLSRISKEXPRSENSEXPRY ,,,1, __   .              (5)  
Hereinafter, i indexes firms, j industries, c countries, and t years. All regressions include firm 
fixed effects (j) and year fixed effects (t) to account for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics and global macroeconomic shocks, respectively. By including the fixed effects 
we can also identify a proposed channel of the effect of expropriation risk on opacity and 
growth. If firms in expropriation-prone industries are more opaque (compared to other 
companies in the same country) in high-expropriation risk countries, 1  in (5) is expected to 
be positive. With regard to the expropriation risk of natural resource industries, by including 
the fixed effects we can also differentiate the transparency channel of the resource curse from 
other, more conventional, channels (e.g., stronger real exchange, as in Krugman (1987)) 
                                                 
9 The OSIRIS database is maintained by the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. It provides a better 
coverage of listed companies (in terms of the number of companies, countries, and information on companies’ 
ownership structure) than Worldscope – a commonly used source of firm data in international finance research. 
The original sources of ownership data include Fitch, Moody’s, Reuters, Thompson Financial, and World Vest 
Base.  
10 The requirement on the ownership variable (used to construct the ownership wedge) reduces our sample size 
from 26,014 firms (112,952 firm-years) to 16,240 firms (79,817firm-years). We confirm that none of our results 
are affected if the analysis is performed on the large sample without controlling for the ownership wedge. 
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documented in the literature.  As suggested by Petersen (2009), we cluster standard errors by 
firms to account for error correlation through time. The standard errors are also robust to 
heteroskedasticity. 
The CONTROLS, which we will define below include variables that proxy for the 
parameters of the model K (external financing needs) and b (firm and country governance). 
We also control for multiple firm characteristics and other determinants of firm-level 
corporate governance identified in the existing literature, as well as the level variables 
EXPR_SENS and EXPR_RISK. 
For the oil industry specifically, we test whether the adverse effects of expropriation risk 
are higher when economic rents are larger, that is, during the periods of high oil prices. For 
this, we include the triple interaction term of the oil firm dummy (OIL_FIRM) with country 
risk of expropriation and log of real oil prices (OIL_PRICE),  
 
.                                                                         
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PRICEOILRISKEXPRFIRMOILY




                    (6)  
With this triple-difference method, we make predictions about within-country differences 
in industry opacity levels and how this difference changes with oil prices. The control 
variables in (6) include all appropriate double interaction terms and variables expressed in 
levels. 
  
B.2. Implications of opacity: capital allocation and growth regressions. There are two 
channels through which expropriation risk may undermine the efficiency capital allocation 
and reduce growth of companies. First, expropriation risk is likely to reduce firm 
transparency, which would adversely affect investment efficiency and growth. Second, 
expropriation may affect the corporate growth directly, for example, when governments seize 
firms’ assets.  
To distinguish between the two effects of expropriation risk, we construct a measure of 
transparency reduction due to expropriation (or other country characteristics), opacity gap. 
For every year and company, opacity gap is calculated as the difference between opacity of a 
sample firm and opacity of a matched (by industry affiliation, size, and growth opportunities) 
U.S. firm. A non-U.S. company that is more opaque than a similar U.S. company would have 
larger values of opacity gap. 
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We then include the opacity gap variable in the following regression (which we also run 
only for the non-U.S. companies and industries), 
.__                                    
_or  _
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
               (7) 
In (7), the coefficient on the opacity gap () measures the effect of reduced transparency on 
capital allocation and growth. The coefficient on the interaction term (1), on the other hand, 
measures the direct effects of expropriation. Since the time-invariant 
CAPITAL_ALLOCATION variable is constructed at the industry level, the above regression is 
estimated with industry and country fixed effects for the capital efficiency analysis. For the 
firm growth regressions, (7) is estimated with firm and year fixed effect. 
 
C. Measures of Sensitivity to Expropriation 
We use three measures of the risk of expropriation, which are constructed at the two-digit 
SIC industry level.  
 
C.1 Oil dependence and the periods of high oil prices. To construct the first proxy for firm 
sensitivity to expropriation, we identify companies that belong to an industry with a primary 
two-digit SIC code equal to 13. This industry includes companies primarily engaged in 
producing crude petroleum and natural gas, and extracting oil from oil sands and oil shale.  In 
our sample, we identify 808 oil and gas firms.  
There is ample anecdotal evidence that natural-resource companies are frequent targets of 
government interference. The quintessential example is the story of expropriation of Yukos, 
once Russia’s largest and most transparent oil company. Goriaev and Sonin (2006) document 
that investors perceived the attacks on Yukos as a strong signal that the state would 
expropriate other private companies as well. They show that the reaction to the Yukos affair 
was more negative for the stocks of more transparent companies than for those of less 
transparent ones. The Yukos affair was certainly not an isolated case and its relevance goes 
well beyond Russia. By studying 98 oil nationalizations that have occurred in 1960-2006 
around the world, Guriev et al. (2011) show that oil companies are more likely to be 
expropriated by governments in countries with imperfect institutions; the risk of 
nationalization is especially large when oil prices are high (even controlling for country fixed 
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effects). Similar logic drove the famous expropriations of oil companies outside the 1960-
2006 period, e.g. Expropiación Petrolera in Mexico in 1935. 
A clear disadvantage of the above measure is that it is binary and identifies only 
companies in the oil and gas industry. To build a continuous measure, we calculate the risk of 
expropriation based on industry profits dependence on oil prices.11 Our underlying premise is 
that the risk of government expropriation is higher for industries whose profits are driven 
more by luck (high prices of oil) rather than managerial skill or effort.12  
To build a proxy for the industry oil dependence we use the coefficient 2SIC at the 
natural logarithm of oil price in a regression of industry inflation-adjusted valuation on time 
trend and log of real oil price,  
  22222 ln SICtoiltSICSICSICSICt PtQ    ,               (8) 
where Q is the median firm valuation (inflation-adjusted) in an industry,  a constant, t time 
trend, Poil inflation-adjusted price of oil, and  the error term. Regression (8) is estimated for 
every two-digit SIC industry using a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms from 
COMPUSTAT tapes from 1950 through 2007.13 We rely on U.S. firms rather than local 
firms to mitigate the impact of country characteristics on the profitability of local industries. 
For example, if we estimated the regression (8) using valuation data from local markets, the 
estimated coefficients would not represent true oil dependence because firms might 
misrepresent corporate profits in fear of expropriation.  
According to Table A in the Appendix, the majority of industries (28 out of 49) show 
negative oil price sensitivities. As expected, industries whose major output is natural 
resources exhibit large and positive sensitivities (especially Petroleum Refining, Oil and Gas 
Extraction, and Metal Mining industries). On the other hand, industries that use oil as a major 
production input, for example, Transportation by Air, have negative sensitivities.  
                                                 
11 As discussed later in the draft, our results remain robust if we use prices of other commodities instead of oil 
price. 
12 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) use a similar argument to differentiate between managerial luck and skill 
in a study of CEOs compensation. 
13 The firm valuation is defined as the sum of firm market value and total assets minus firm book value of 
equity over firm total assets Oil prices (in U.S. dollars) are obtained from the International Finance Statistics 
(IFS) available through the International Monetary Fund. We inflation-adjust oil prices by dividing the series by 
the U.S. Purchasing Price Index from the IFS. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the hypothesis of a unit 
root in firm valuation and log of oil price series. 
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C.2 Human capital intensity. The second measure is based on the intensity of human capital. 
One can argue that industries that rely on skilled labor for the production processes face 
lower risks of expropriation because human capital is alienable; and it is hard to replace 
skilled workers to keep the company profitable. Consistent with this conjecture, Opp (2010) 
formally shows that high-technology industries are less likely to experience government 
expropriation.  
The human capital measure is constructed using the algorithm outlines in Wang (2010). 
Specifically, we rely on the U.S. Current Population Survey.14 We classify workers as 
college educated if they have at least sixteen years of education. For every two-digit SIC 
industry i and year t, we define human capital as the share of workers with a college 
education, 

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where w is the survey weight and college is the dummy variable for worker n if the worker 
completes a college degree. We then average the above measure for years from 1995 through 
2007.15 As Table A in the Appendix indicates, Educational Services, Investment Offices, and 
Brokers industries employ more skilled workers, while Construction, Tobacco, and Forestry 
industries employ less. 
 
C.3 Industry expropriation instances. Finally, following Guriev et al. (2011) we collect data 
on the actual number of expropriations. To construct the measure of expropriation instances, 
we search news articles using Lexis-Nexis for the period from 1990 through 2006. The 
keywords we use are: “nationalization”, “expropriation”, “forced sale”, and “forced 
ownership transfer.” The largest number of expropriation has been observed in the oil and 
gas extraction industry. We observe that more oil-dependent industries or industries that rely 
                                                 
14 The Current Population Survey is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is considered to be the primary source of information 
on the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. Estimates obtained from the CPS include employment, 
unemployment, earnings, hours of work, and other indicators. They are available by a variety of demographic 
characteristics including age, sex, race, marital status, and educational attainment. They are also available by 
occupation, industry, and class of worker.  
15 Survey weights are equal to the probability of being sampled. Sample weights are needed to derive population 
estimates from the survey sample to obtain unbiased estimates for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized 
population.  
 20
less on skilled labor are less likely to be expropriated. Our regressions exclude the firms for 
which the expropriation risk has materialized. The pairwise correlations are 0.450 between 
oil dependence and expropriations (p-val = 0.00); and 0.290 between human capital and 
expropriation instances (p-val = 0.04).  
 
C.4 Unified Expropriation Index. We aggregate the three expropriation sensitivity measures 
into a single index using the Principal Component Analysis. We call this index the unified 
expropriation index.16 The first principal component captures 71% of the corresponding 
cross-sectional variance of the four variables. Moreover, only the first eigenvalue is 
significantly larger than one; thus one factor is sufficient to capture much of the common 
variation among the variables. The loadings for the unified index (based on the Principal 
Component Analysis) are: 0.60 for oil dependence, 0.46 for human capital intensity, and 
0.66 for expropriation instances. The three industries with the highest unified risk of 
expropriation are Oil and Gas Extraction, Pipelines, and Tobacco industries.  On the other 
hand, Educational Services, Brokers, and Insurance Agencies are the three industries with the 
lowest expropriation risk.  
 
D. Measures of Firm Opacity, Capital Allocation Efficiency, and Growth 
 
D.1 Income reducing strategies. One of the common strategies to reduce reported income is 
using negative discretionary accruals. Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) indicate that petroleum 
companies used negative accruals to reduce earnings out of fear of government litigation. We 
measure discretionary accruals using the methodology in Chaney et al. (2010) augmented by 
the Kothari’s (2005) account for firm performance. Controlling for firm performance is 
shown to reduce the effect of the mechanical relation between a current period’s 
discretionary accruals estimates and performance. Using the Kothari’s method we can either 
match firms by country affiliation, industry group, and return on assets (ROA) or include past 
ROA directly in the discretionary accruals regression. We choose the latter approach (to 
                                                 
16 The Principal Component Analysis is a statistical method to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower 
dimensions. This method can be viewed as an orthogonal linear transformation that alters the data to a new 
coordinate system such that the greatest variance by any projection of the data comes to lie on the first 
coordinate (called the first principal component), the second greatest variance on the second coordinate, and so 
on. See Stevens (1986) for details.  
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control for past ROA) because there are many countries in our sample with few companies, 
making the matching difficult.17  
We estimate discretionary current accruals for every firm i and year t by pooling firms 
according to their two-digit SIC affiliation and running the following cross-sectional 
regression, 
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The current accruals (CA) is net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization, minus operating cash flow, S net sales, A total assets, PPE property, plant, and 
equipment, and ROA return on assets. The above regression also controls for country-specific 
business cycles by including growth in real GDP (GGDP) and inflation (INFL).  Using assets 
as the deflator is intended to mitigate heteroskedasticity in residuals. The above regression 
includes a constant term because  it provides an additional control for heteroskedasticity not 
alleviated by assets as the deflator. PPE variable is intended to capture variation in 
depreciation expense. Then we use the estimated parameters of the above regression to 
calculate expected current accruals,  
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Here, AR is accounts receivables. By including this variable we assume that sales are not 
managed in the estimation period, but that the entire change in accounts receivable in the 
event year represents earnings management. Then discretionary current accruals for every 
firm and year is the difference between current accruals and expected current accruals, 
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We multiply the DCA variable by -1 so that larger numbers correspond to more income 
reduction. We call this variable income reducing discretionary accruals.  
                                                 
17 Even though we lose 10% of the sample, our results do not change if we control for performance by 
matching. 
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D2. Opacity index. In addition to the income reducing measure, we construct the aggregate 
opacity index. The index consists of three components. The first one, accounting opacity, 
measures reported earnings quality. The second component, insider opacity, reflects 
information asymmetry about firm value. The third measure, informational opacity, reflects 
the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into stock prices. These variables are 
calculated for every firm and year in the sample.  
Accounting opacity is based on the quality of earnings reported in firms’ financial 
statements. Managers often use earnings management to obscure information about a 
company’s operating performance (see, e.g., Leuz et al. (2003)). To construct the accounting 
opacity, we take the absolute value of discretionary accruals defined above. Unlike the 
measure of negative accruals, this variable also accounts for cases in which a company uses 
positive accruals to boost reported earnings.  
We construct the second component of opacity, insider opacity, to capture the aggregate 
level of information asymmetry about a company. We use a measure developed by Llorente 
et al. (2002), which is based on stock return autocorrelation conditional on trading volume. 
The authors argue that during periods of intense trading volume, hedging trades generate 
negatively autocorrelated returns, and private information trades generate positively 
autocorrelated returns. The greater the information asymmetry between the two groups of 
traders, the more likely it is that returns are positively autocorrelated (conditional on trading 
volume). Their model suggests the following relation between returns and trading volume: 
titititititi VrCrCVrrE ,,2,1,,1, ],|[    ,  
where E is the expectation operator, ri,t is the return for company i in period t, and Vi,t is 
trading volume. They argue that C2 is larger when information asymmetry about a company 
is higher.  
We define insider opacity as coefficient C2 in the time-series regression,  
wiwiwiiwiiiwi VrCrCAr ,,,2,,1,1,   ,               
run for every firm i during year t using weekly (w) returns and volume data. Data for firm 
returns and trading volume are from Datastream. In the above regression, A is the intercept, 
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C1 and C2 are the regression coefficients, and  is the error term. Larger values for the insider 
opacity variable (C2) correspond to greater information asymmetry.18  
As a final component of opacity, we use a measure of information-based trading 
measured by the degree of stock prices asynchronicity developed in Morck et al. (2000). 
Intuitively, if a firm’s stock return is highly correlated with the market factor then the stock 
return is less likely to contain firm-specific information. On the other hand, if the stock return 
moves asynchronously with the market return, it is indicative of more firm-specific 
information impounded into stock prices. 
We calculate stock returns asynchronicity by decomposing the variation in local 
individual stock returns into two components: the unexplained (residual) sum of squares and 
explained (by local market index and U.S. index) sum of squares. To perform the 
decomposition we first run the following regression for every firm and year: 
wi
US
wmiwmiiwi rrr ,,,2,,1,   ,                          
where wir ,  is firm i’s weekly return, wmr ,  the value-weighted local market return, and 
US
wmr ,  the 
value-weighted market return in the U.S. All returns are expressed in U.S. dollars. We define 
informational opacity for every firm and year as the logarithmic transformation of one minus 
the coefficient of determination of the above regression,  )1/(ln ,2,,2, titi RR  . High values of 
informational opacity mean that individual stock returns move more synchronously with 
local and U.S. market indexes which reflects less informative (in terms of firm-specific 
information) stock prices.  
The above methodologies result in three indexes of opacity. To isolate the common 
component of the cross-section of each index, we use the Principal Component Analysis. 
Every loading of the principal component enters with the positive sign reflecting the fact that 
the three measures are positively correlated. The loadings are 0.68 for accounting opacity, 
0.35 for informational opacity, and 0.64 for insider opacity. 
                                                 
18 There is ample empirical evidence that coefficient C2 is related to other measures of information asymmetry. 
Specifically, Llorente et al. verify that C2 is positive (negative) for companies that are more (less) likely to 
suffer from information asymmetry; that is, firms with high (low) bid-ask spread, small (large) size, and/or with 
fewer (more) analysts following. In a supportive study, Grishchenko et al. (2003) show that C2 is, on average, 
larger for firms that are located in countries where information asymmetry problems are more severe, such as 
countries with poor disclosure requirements or countries that have weak corporate governance. This variable is 
also used by Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) for international firms to measure the amount of private information 
trading caused by information asymmetry between traders. In a recent paper, Gagnon et al. (2009) confirm that 
C2 is smaller for firms in countries with more transparent stock markets.   
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Our methodology assumes that the states cannot decipher firms’ true performance from 
publicly available accounting numbers. While it is plausible that governments can expose a 
part of firms’ profits, it is unlikely they can do it perfectly. Even if they can, an equilibrium 
response for firms would be to always reveal performance truthfully (see Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) for a more detailed discussion). On the other hand, while the 
governments know that some sectors are more profitable than others, they are likely to be 
selective in their decisions which companies to predate on as it can be prohibitively costly to 
seize specific sectors of the economy.  
 
D3. Capital allocation and growth. Following Wurgler (2000), capital allocation efficiency is 
defined as the country-specific, two-digit SIC industry-specific elasticity ( cj ) of investment 
(measured by capital expenditures, I) with respect to firm value (Q), for which we estimate a 
panel regression (with firm and year fixed effects) 
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                (9) 
for every industry j and country c using all firm annual data from 1980 through 2007.19 
Holding everything else constant, larger values of cj  mean better investment efficiency 
because efficient capital allocation prescribes an increase in investment in growing industries 
and a decrease in investment in declining industries.20 Firm growth (GROWTH) is measured 
as the annual growth in real sales. Capital allocation is an industry-specific measure 
(available for 818 industry-country observations), while growth is a firm-specific one. 
 
E. Country Risk of Expropriation 
A country-specific assessment of expropriation risk is obtained from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The variable, ICRG Investment Profile, is the assessment of 
risk of investment due to contract viability/expropriation and profits repatriation. We use this 
index because it is available for every country in the sample for a long period of time. The 
index ranges from 0 (high expropriation risk) to 12 (low expropriation risk). We subtract the 
                                                 
19 Our results are robust if we use sales instead of firm value in (9). One can argue that using sales is preferable 
because firm value is measured with error for more opaque companies. 
20 The elasticity coefficient in (9) can be biased because of omitted variables. For example, investments in 
resources-extraction industries are responsive to the value of investment options. To account for this, we repeat 
regression (9) with an additional variable - oil price volatility. Our results do not change.  
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index values from 12 so that larger numbers correspond to larger risk of expropriation. We 
take quarterly averages from 1995 through 2007 to derive annual series. In the robustness 
section, we discuss alternative definitions of expropriation risk. 
 
F. Control Variables 
 
F.1 Controls for firm agency problems. Ownership data helps us address an alternative 
explanation of our main results. One can claim that lower transparency is not driven by the 
risk of expropriation by the government but rather by the insiders who use opacity to divert 
profits from the outside investors. This may happen in countries where the states do not 
provide adequate protection of outside investors and in firms that practice poor corporate 
governance. To control for this type of agency problems, we include firm ownership wedge 
(difference between control rights and ownership rights of the ultimate shareholders). Firms 
with the higher wedge are more likely to divert profits from outside shareholders and have 
lower transparency.  
Ownership data come from the OSIRIS Ownership database. It contains detailed 
information about shareholder identity and their percentage of ownership. The ownership 
encompasses direct and indirect ownership links, as well an identity of an ultimate owner. It 
enables us to calculate the firm ownership wedge, the difference between control rights and 
cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder. According to Faccio and Lang (2002), La Porta 
et al. (2002), and Paligorova and Xu (2010), this variable may be used as a proxy for the 
degree of agency costs in a firm. Control rights can exceed cash flow rights because of 
pyramidal structure, cross-holdings, and dual-class shares. For example, if the controlling 
shareholder owns ten percent of company A’s outstanding shares, which in turn owns 30 
percent of firm B’s shares, then she is considered to control ten percent of firm B, the 
weakest link in the chain of control rights. However, the cash flow rights of firm B owned by 
the controlling shareholder is only three percent (10%×30%). 
To calculate the wedge, we first identify an ultimate owner defined as a shareholder 
owning more than 20% direct or indirect voting rights. We then trace indirect links down the 
pyramid (a firm belongs to a pyramid if it is controlled by an ultimate owner and owns one 
more companies). Thirty percent of the sample firms in OSIRIS can be classified as pyramids 
at the 20% level with 29% of firms having an ultimate owner. Ownership wedge variable is 
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available for 16,240 sample firm (79,817 firm-years) for years from 1995 through 2007. To 
condition some of our test on government ownership, we identify firms with state as an 
ultimate owner. In our sample, 1,815 firms (8,893 firm-years) have state ownership. For 
firms with non-zero state ownership, the average ownership stake is 38%.  
As the second measure of agency problems, we consider the external financing need. 
External financing need is defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the industry median 
value (over 1995-2007) of capital expenditures minus cash flows from operations divided by 
capital expenditures for U.S. companies. Companies in greater need for external financing 
are expected to have fewer agency problems. 
 
F.2 Other control variables. In addition to firm and year fixed effects, we use multiple 
additional controls. Specifically, we include for GDP per capita and rule of law in the 
country because they can have direct impacts on firm opacity.21 We also control for 
interactions of industry expropriation sensitivity with GDP per capita and the rule of law to 
reduce the possibility that we simply capture the effect of weak legal regime and not weak 
property rights. We also control for the level of financial development (the sum of stock 
market capitalization and private credit relative to GDP) because firms have lower incentives 
to misreport accounting numbers in more financially developed countries.  
To differentiate between the risk of expropriation and taxes, we control the level of 
effective corporate taxes (taken from Djankov et al. (2010)). Moreover, we include the 
assessment of the fairness of the tax system, tax burden, from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit. It is measured whether how corporate taxation impedes the development of private 
businesses. 
At the firm level, we include characteristics that were shown to affect incentives to 
disclose information (Doidge et al. (2003)). They include: growth opportunities (lagged 
percentage change in sales) and firm size (logarithm of total assets). We also control for 
cross-listing by adding the cross-listing dummy, which is equal to one if a firm’s shares are 
listed on a U. S. exchange, and zero otherwise.22 Finally, in some specifications, we control 
for volatility of fundamentals, calculated using a rolling-window method with five years of 
                                                 
21 The rule of law variable is a quantitative assessment of the strength of a country’s tradition of law and order, 
and it is taken from the ICRG. 
22 Privately placed ADRs through Rule 144a and over-the-counter stocks are excluded. 
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sales data, because Hribar and Nichols (2007) document an omitted variables bias when an 
unsigned version of accruals is used.23   
In the growth regressions (7), we use the following additional control variables: 
interaction of intangible assets intensity with country expropriation risk index (Claessens and 
Laeven (2003) show that in countries with more secure property rights, intangibles-intensive 
industries grow faster), and interaction of industry need for external financing with country 
financial development (according to Rajan and Zingales (1998), firms in greater need for 
financing grow faster in better financially developed markets). 
To reduce the impact of outliers, we winsorize every firm and industry-level variable at 
the 1% and 99% levels. We note that our results do not change if winsorization is not 
performed. 
 
G. Summary Statistics  
Panel B in the Appendix provides the summary statistics of the main variables by country: 
oil reserves, number of firms, number of firm-years, number of companies in oil and gas 
extraction industry, risk of expropriation, income decreasing accruals, accounting opacity, 
insider opacity, informational opacity, and aggregate opacity.  
Firms in the U.K., Spain, and Singapore face the lowest risk of expropriation, while in 
Venezuela, Nigeria, and Pakistan the risks are the highest. According to the aggregate 
opacity index, the most transparent companies are in Denmark, U.K., and Canada, while the 
most opaque ones are in Russia, Vietnam, and Serbia. Canada has the largest number of oil 
companies in our sample – 131. 
The unreported correlation coefficients between the main variables indicate that, across 
the sample countries, risk of expropriation is positively and significantly correlated with 
aggregate opacity and its components (accounting opacity, insider opacity, and informational 
opacity). Some of the aggregate opacity components are weakly correlated (e.g., 
informational opacity is not correlated with insider opacity or accounting opacity), indicating 
that the components measure different aspects of opacity.  
 
                                                 
23 Our result also survive a long list of additional control parameters suggested by Francis et al. (2004). They 
include: leverage, market-to-book, log of market capitalization, and operating cycle (the log of the sum of days 
in receivable and days in inventory). We do not include them in the main tables to save space. 
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III. Empirical Results 
To test our predictions, we first run regressions as in (5) using the difference-in-difference 
approach and test whether expropriation-prone companies are more opaque in countries with 
greater expropriation risk. Then, using the sample of oil companies, we test if the above 
effect is stronger during the periods of high oil prices by using the triple-difference method 
as in (6). The reported p-values are calculated using robust standard errors that are clustered 
by firm and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
 
A. Impact of Expropriation Risk on Expropriation-sensitive Companies 
Table I presents regressions using the difference-in-difference method with the aggregate 
opacity as the dependent variable and double interactions of expropriation sensitivities (oil 
dependence, human capital, expropriation instances, and unified expropriation sensitivity) 
with country expropriation risk. Every specification controls for the level variables 
(expropriation sensitivity and risk of expropriation) and multiple industry and firm variables 
described in the data section, including the variables for the agency problem (ownership gap 
and the need for external financing). The results indicate that firms whose profits are 
correlated with the price of oil, as well as firms that rely less on human capital, are more 
opaque if they are located in countries with a high risk of expropriation (the interaction terms 
of industry oil dependence and human capital with country risk of expropriation are highly 
significant). A similar relation is observed if industry sensitivity to expropriation is measured 
by the observed number of expropriations or when we combine the three expropriation 
sensitivities into a unified index.   
We note that the above relations are not driven by agency problems as we control for 
ownership wedge. While firms with a larger ownership wedge are significantly more opaque, 
expropriation risk is a first-order effect for company opacity. Moreover, as we have argued, 
the observed opacity is expected to be lower for industries that require more external 
financing for their growth because a greater need for external financing requires managers to 
practice better governance. Consistent with our prediction, industries in greater need for 
external financing are less opaque and the adverse effect of expropriation risk on opacity is 
lessened for such industries; this is evident from the negative and marginally significant (at 
the 10% level) coefficient on the need for external financing and interaction of external 
financing need with expropriation risk.  
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We also note that, while the effective corporate tax rate has no effect on opacity, the 
assessment of the fairness of tax system works similarly to the risk of expropriation. In every 
specification, the burden of taxation variable is positive and significant.  
To evaluate the economic significance of the above results, we compare the aggregate 
opacity of companies that belong to a high-expropriation risk industry (petroleum refining, 
aggregate expropriation index = 0.614) to the opacity of companies that belong to a low-
expropriation risk industry (electronic equipment, aggregate opacity index = 0.142) in two 
countries, Venezuela (high risk of expropriation = 7.580) and Norway (low risk of 
expropriation = 2.285). Based on the regression coefficient of 0.00784 (from Table I), the 
petroleum refining industry in Norway is more opaque than the electronics industry, and the 
difference is equal to 0.00784 × (0.614 – 0.142) × 2.285  =  0.00846. In Venezuela, however, 
the difference is larger, and it equals 0.00784 × (0.614 – 0.142) × 7.580 = 0.02805, which is 
6% larger relative to the sample average of opacity of 0.350.24 
In Table II, we examine the individual components of the opacity index and use the 
unified expropriation index interacted with country expropriation risk as the main 
independent variable. First, we use the unsigned version of discretionary accruals as a 
measure of income-decreasing discretionary accruals. The positive and significant coefficient 
on the interaction term of the unified expropriation sensitivity with country risk of 
expropriation indicates that companies are more likely to under-report income using negative 
accruals if the risk of expropriation is high.  Next, we use the accounting opacity (the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals) as a measure of earning quality. It turns out that the 
main variable of interest, the double interaction term, has the largest impact on accounting 
opacity (in terms of coefficient magnitude and its significance level) compared to the 
remaining two opacity measures, insider opacity and informational opacity. When the second 
opacity component is used, the informational opacity, the coefficient on the interaction of 
expropriation sensitivity with country expropriation risk is significant as well. However, it 
becomes less significant for the third opacity component, insider opacity; the coefficient on 
the double interaction term is significant at the 10% level.  
Table III presents the estimates of regression (6) (the triple-difference approach) with the 
oil industry indicator variable as a measure of expropriation sensitivity conditional on 
country risk of exportations. The dependent variables are: income decreasing accruals, 
                                                 
24 The reported regression coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
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aggregate opacity index, and its components (accounting opacity, and insider opacity, and 
informational opacity). The variable of interest is the triple interaction term of oil and gas 
industry with country risk of expropriation and oil price. Since the inference based on a triple 
interaction can only be made when all appropriate interaction terms are in the regression, we 
also control for appropriate double interactions (oil industry with country risk of 
expropriation, oil price with country risk of expropriation, and oil industry with oil price) and 
variables expressed levels. According to Table III, firms in the oil industry in countries with 
greater expropriation risks use more income reducing negative accruals, especially during 
periods of high oil prices. This is evident from the positive and significant coefficient on the 
triple interaction term. A similar relation is observed when individual components of the 
opacity index are used or when we use the aggregate opacity index. Some of the double 
interaction effects are significant as well. Specifically, oil industries are less transparent in 
high-expropriation risk countries, independent of oil price; the coefficient on the interaction 
of oil industry with risk of expropriation is positive and significant. From this table we 
conclude that oil companies obfuscate their financial and accounting information in fear of 
state expropriation, and their incentives to hide information is greater when economic rents 
are higher, that is, during the period of high oil prices.  
With regard to high oil prices, one can argue that higher rents decrease the need for 
external financing and reduce incentives to disclose information. Since we explicitly control 
for the need for external financing, our difference-in-difference approach mitigates the direct 
effect of the higher oil price on the cash flows of oil firms, which results in lower 
transparency. Our approach captures the differential effect of oil price in countries with high 
and low expropriation risk given the need for external finance. 
The results in Tables I -III are consistent with the predictions of our stylized theoretical 
model. As the risk of expropriation increases, industries which are more susceptible to 
expropriation under-report their income by using negative accruals, and become more 
opaque. For the oil companies, this effect is especially strong during periods of high oil 
prices. The observed results are not driven by agency considerations. The results are robust to 
multiple definitions of opacity (information opacity, accounting opacity and the aggregate 
index, which captures the common component of the three individual constituents). 
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B.  Other Commodities 
Our results in Table I are not specific to industry oil dependence. In this section, we report 
the estimates from re-running our regressions for other commodities. Specifically, we 
construct the measures of industry profits sensitivity to other commodity prices.  
The commodities price data come from the Bureau of Commodity Research (BCR). The 
BCR tracks the prices of 22 commodities, which are grouped into 7 indexes: metals, raw 
industrial materials, textiles, foods, fats, livestock, and a composite commodities index. The 
prices used in the index are obtained from trade publications and government agencies. 
Although the sub-indexes are highly correlated among each other, the sensitivities of 
industrial profitability to particular commodity indexes are not. For example, oil dependence 
is positively and significantly correlated with sensitivities constructed using metals, raw 
industrial materials, and the composite commodity index. It is uncorrelated with textiles, 
foods, fats, and livestock commodity indexes.  
Table IV summarizes main regression results with the seven sensitivities described 
above. We only report the coefficients on the interaction terms of commodity price 
sensitivities with country risk of expropriation. For comparison, the first row of Table IV 
contains the coefficient on the double interaction term for oil dependence with country 
expropriation risk reported in the first column of Tables I. It is apparent that the result holds 
for the composite commodity index (we exclude oil from the index).  Out of the seven 
indexes, the coefficients are significant for metals and raw industrial materials. Interestingly, 
textiles, foods, fats, and livestock do not affect opacity in any consistent way. These results 
are broadly consistent with Boschini et al. (2006) who show that the resource curse is mostly 
driven by mineral resources (especially by oil, diamonds and precious metals) rather than by 
agricultural resources.25  
 
C. Expropriation Risk, Capital Allocation, and Growth 
In this section, we show that expropriation-sensitive industries exhibit worse investment 
efficiency and grow more slowly when property rights are weak. By including the opacity 
gap variable (difference between a firm’s observed opacity and opacity of a similar firm in 
                                                 
25 Boschini et al. (2006) show that the negative effect of resource abundance on growth depends on the extent of 
the resources’ “appropriability.” As rents from mining oil, diamonds, and precious metals are easier to capture 
than the rents in agricultural production, the countries richer in the former resources are more vulnerable to the 
resource curse. 
 32
the U.S.) along with the interactions (expropriation sensitivity with risk of expropriation) we 
differentiate between efficiency and growth reduction caused by opacity and direct risks of 
expropriation. If capital efficiency and firm growth deteriorate because of lower 
transparency, we expect the coefficient on the opacity gap variable to be significant. On the 
other hand, the interaction term should matter if investment efficiency and growth are 
directly affected by expropriation.26 
In Panel A of Table V, we report the results of the regression when the dependent 
variable is firm sales growth. The main variables of interest are the opacity gap and the 
double interaction term of industry unified expropriation sensitivity with country risk of 
expropriation. The coefficient on opacity gap is positive and highly significant indicating that 
more opaque companies (relative to similar U.S. firms) grow slower. The coefficient on the 
double interaction is also negative but less significant (p-value = 3%) indicating that both 
effects take place: firms grow slower because they are more opaque and also because their 
cash flows are at risk due to expropriation. The interaction effects of external financing with 
financial development is positive and significant (financially dependent firms grow faster in 
more financially developed countries), while those of intangibles intensity with expropriation 
risk turn out insignificant.  
Based on regression coefficients in the first specification of Table V, we calculate the 
drop in firm growth resulting from deterioration in transparency and compare it to the 
reduction in growth resulting from expropriation risk. As in the previous examples, consider 
two countries, Norway (average opacity gap = 0.466) and Venezuela (average opacity gap = 
1.300). The coefficient on the opacity gap variable is equal to – 0.028.  Therefore, holding 
everything else constant, the reduction in firm growth due to increased opacity in Venezuela 
is –0.028 × (1.300 – 0.466) = –2.34% which is a significant reduction relative to the sample 
average firm growth rate of 6%. The reduction in firm growth due to direct risks of 
expropriation, however, is of similar magnitude and equal to –3.13%.27 Evidently, firm 
growth suffers because of both opacity caused by state predation and direct risks of 
expropriation.  
                                                 
26 The proposed approach does not take out the effect of a weaker legal environment. The results do not change 
if the effect of the legal environment is removed by the regressing firm opacity on firm, industry, and country 
variables, including rule of law, and using the residuals as a proxy for the opacity gap.  
27 It is calculated as  –0.019  × (0.521 – 0.210) × (7.580 – 2.285) = –3.13%, where –0.019 is the coefficient on 
the triple interaction term, 0.521 and 0.210 are the average values of the unified expropriation sensitivity in 
Venezuela and Norway, and 7.580 and 2.285 are expropriation risks for Venezuela and Norway, respectively.  
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With regard to capital allocation (Panel B of Table V), the results are also consistent with 
the predictions.28 The coefficient on opacity gap is negative and significant indicating that 
more opaque companies are less likely to increase (decrease) investment when its value 
grows (shrinks). The coefficient on the triple interaction variable, however, is negative but 
much less significant. This shows that capital allocation efficiency is lower mostly due to 
increased opacity triggered by the risks of expropriation and not directly by expropriation.  
Taken together, the results indicate that expropriation sensitive industries grow slower 
and invest less efficiently in countries with weak property rights. A part of the reduction in 
growth and investment efficiency results from lower transparency triggered by the risk of 
expropriation.  
  
IV. Robustness 
Our results are robust to alternative interpretations, endogeneity, and different definitions 
of main variables.29  
 
A. Alternative Explanations 
Using the data on government ownership, we perform further tests to distinguish between 
state expropriation and state collusion hypotheses. Expropriation is less likely to be directed 
towards state-owned firms. At the same time, if managers of state-owned companies collude 
with government officials to divert from minority shareholders, they are more likely to 
increase opacity. Therefore, we predict that if the expropriation effect dominates the agency 
costs effect, the risk of expropriation by the government is expected to have little impact on 
the opacity of state-owned firms. This is confirmed in Table VI, in which we condition our 
tests on state ownership. Specifically, by using the double interaction term of the unified 
expropriation sensitivity with country risk of expropriation, we run separate regressions on 
the sample of firms without government ownership (Panel A) and with government 
ownership (Panel B). It is apparent that the risk of expropriation (interacted with 
expropriation sensitivity) matters only for firms with no state ownership. The Wald-test of 
                                                 
28 The capital allocation measure is country- and industry-specific, and it does not vary through time. Since our 
regression includes industry and country fixed effects, we cannot include certain time-invariant double 
interactions, or any of the country and firm control variables.    
29 We do not tabulate some of the robustness results. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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the regression coefficients equivalence (between different sets of data) indicates that the 
coefficients between the two sets of data are statistically different. We therefore conclude 
that firms are opaque because of the risk of expropriation and not because managers divert 
from minority shareholders.  
Furthermore, although industry fixed effects and firm variables are included to control for 
unobserved characteristics, we can never be sure that our results are not driven by missing 
factors. Companies can reduce the risk of government expropriation by becoming more 
indispensable to the state. This can be achieved, for instance, by seeking greater 
internationalization, securing higher levels of short-term debt, and/or hiring more employees. 
To check the robustness of our results, we explicitly control for the aforementioned factors 
and confirm that our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.30  
For the tests in Table III, as oil price is the same for all countries and industries in a given 
year, it may capture the effect of the time dummies. We therefore replace oil price with 
country oil reserves. Unlike oil price, oil reserves are country- and year-specific. As oil 
reserves are measured as economically relevant proven reserves, this variable is a good proxy 
for the expected Net Present Value of future rents given the prevailing technology and oil 
price. Therefore, oil reserves also capture corporate rents in the oil industry and oil-
dependent industries; our model implies that oil-dependent industries should be less 
transparent in countries with predatory governments and greater oil reserves, and this is what 
we confirm empirically. Furthermore, many companies are diversified across geographical 
regions. This can potentially bias our results because, for example, a U.K. company operating 
in Nigeria is subject to greater political risk than a company with operations only in the U.K. 
However, in our sample, there are more oil companies from stronger institutional 
environments operating in countries with weaker institutional environments than vice versa. 
Therefore, if a bias were to exist, we would be less likely to observe our results if 
geographical diversification were present. Nevertheless, we have obtained detailed 
                                                 
30 Companies with greater international exposure may be more immune to government expropriation. When 
shareholder rights are violated, investors can file claims in international rather than local courts. To control for 
internalization we include the value of exports relative to sales. Companies can also alter their capital structure 
to elude government capture. It is established that debt rather than equity, and in particular short-term debt, is a 
main source of financing in developing countries (see, e.g., Harvey et al. (2004)). Short-term debt can serve not 
only as a monitoring device but also as an instrument to make state capture costlier (Stulz (2005)). 
Consequently, we control for the level of short-term debt (past ratio of short-term debt to sales). Finally, firms 
that employ more workers would presumably suffer less from government interference because unemployment-
conscious governments are less likely to bring a firm to bankruptcy. We control for employment by the ratio of 
the number of employees to sales. 
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information on geographical segments and repeated our tests based on the sample of single-
segment companies. Although we lose 40% of the sample, the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
It is possible that some of our results are driven by changes in firms’ fundamentals in 
response to economic shocks. For example, high oil prices may stabilize firms’ 
fundamentals. More stable fundamentals, in turn, affect the measure of informational opacity, 
since firms with more stable earnings are also likely to have similar returns. This reasoning, 
however, would affect only one opacity measure, namely the informational opacity. There is 
no reason to expect that the other measures of opacity (income-reducing accruals, insider 
opacity and accounting opacity) are affected by changes in firm fundamentals. We further 
check the robustness of the results by directly controlling for firms’ fundamentals stability. 
We measure it as the coefficient of determination (R2) of the following time-series 
regression, 
ti
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where ROAi is the return on assets for company i, ROAm is the value-weighted average of 
ROA across all firms in a country, and UStmROA ,  is the value-weighted average of ROA across 
U.S. firms. The main results reported above remain unchanged with this additional control. 
 
B. Endogeneity 
We claim that companies strategically withhold information in response to the risk of 
expropriation. However, one could argue that causality runs in the opposite direction. 
Specifically, more opaque companies, especially government monopolies, may try to secure 
natural resources rents by lobbying for the type of government that would set up inefficient 
institutions. This view, nonetheless, would be inconsistent with the findings by Guriev at al. 
(2011), who show that oil companies are under a greater risk of nationalization by 
governments in countries with imperfect institutions. Moreover, our results indicate that the 
effect of predation on opacity is actually larger when oil prices are high.  
To address endogeneity of country expropriation risk, we repeat every regression 
instrumenting expropriation risk with a set of exogenous variables: proportion of Catholics, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and settlers’ mortality rate. These instruments were shown 
to be related to the level of institutional development, while they are not likely to directly 
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affect individual firms’ reporting choices and growth. 31 We also run a series of tests to show 
that these instruments are relevant and indeed exogenous. We then re-run our main 
regressions with the instrumental variables. The results are very similar (in terms of 
coefficients magnitude and their levels of significance) to those reported.  
Another source of endogeneity can arise from the measurement error of expropriation 
sensitivity, which is used as an independent variable. As suggested by Newey (1983), the 
measurement bias in multivariate linear models can be attenuated in the General Method of 
Moments estimation. Moreover, the dependent variables (transparency and growth in our 
case) can be serially correlated. We address the issues of the error-in-variables and serial 
correlation by re-estimating every regression by the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic 
panel-data General Method of Moments. This method is designed for panel data sets with 
autocorrelated dependent variables and unobserved fixed characteristics. All of the results 
survive.  
 
C. Other Robustness Checks 
As an alternative measure of property rights protection, we consider the degree of 
political autocracy. Djankov et al. (2002) argue that members of autocratic governments are 
less constrained than the democratic ones, and thus they are more likely to pursue rent-
seeking. The results do not change if we use this variable. All of the results are also robust if 
we construct a unified risk of expropriation index (using the Principal Component Analysis) 
that consists of multiple attributes: corruption in government, the risk of government 
expropriation, the lack of property rights protection, government stance towards business, 
freedom to compete, and the quality of bureaucracy The data are the Economist Intelligence 
Unit. Moreover, to ascertain that the results are not driven by a specific country, we repeat all 
of the regression by dropping one country at a time from the sample. We find similar patterns 
in the magnitudes and significance levels of the coefficients reported in Tables I-VI. Finally, 
                                                 
31 La Porta et al. (1999) argue that governments usually intervene more in countries with greater ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization or a larger proportion of Catholics or Muslims. According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), in 
countries with greater mortality rates due to tropical diseases, the settlers were more likely to set up weak 
property rights in order to extract rents from the native population. We verify the relevance by regressing the 
predation index on the instruments. The F-test of joint significance is equal to 9.14 indicating the relevance of 
the instruments. The instruments also pass the exogeneity J-test of over-identifying restrictions.  
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the results are robust if include industry-year fixed effects to control for changes in industry 
regulation. 
 
V. Related Literature 
 
Our paper is related to three streams of literature. First, there are studies that examine the 
implications of firm corporate governance and disclosure for efficiency and growth. Second, 
there is literature on the political economy of corporate governance that shows that imperfect 
political institutions may result in inefficient disclosure and suboptimal corporate 
governance. Third, there is the resource curse literature, which focuses on the interaction of 
resource abundance and institutions and their effects on economic growth. Our paper 
connects all of the three streams of literature as we build a consistent microeconomic 
argument linking poor property rights protection, incentives to withhold information, and 
slower growth. We identify a specific channel of corporate transparency through which 
expropriation risk affects corporate growth. Finally, we directly test the importance of this 
channel using a large panel of firm-level data.    
The first stream of literature investigates the relationship between investor protection, 
firm governance, disclosure, and economic growth. It is shown that better legal protection for 
investors is associated with higher valuation of the stock market (La Porta et al. (2002)). 
Recent firm-level studies also show that good corporate governance structures implemented 
by individual firms yield higher returns for shareholders (see, e.g., Doidge et al. (2003)). Qi 
et al. (2010) document that property rights protection and political stability reduce the spread 
of corporate bonds. Related to our result that expropriation risk reduces investment 
efficiency, Claessens et al (2010) show that better institutional environment results in better 
capital allocation through lowering firm financial transaction costs and reducing the required 
rate of return. With regard to accounting reporting choices, our paper is related to literature 
that examines the effects of government intervention on the quality of information. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) develop a positive accounting theory which studies how firms make 
accounting choices under risk of government intervention. This positive accounting theory 
has been empirically confirmed by Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) who show that in the U.S., 
oil producers underreport profitability to decrease tax liability.  
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The literature on the effects of political institutions on corporate governance is related to 
the classical political theories described in North (1990) and Olson (1993). These theories 
contend that individuals and governments who hold authority shape policies to increase their 
chances to stay in power and accumulate wealth. According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), 
centralized and closed governments can achieve these goals by constraining financial 
development. Politicians can also suppress competition to maintain their economic 
advantage. For example, states might control information (especially firm-specific 
information) to hide expropriation by politicians (Bushman et al. (2004)). Moreover, the 
deals between some firms and governments require opaqueness. Chaney et al. (2010) find 
that the quality of earnings reported by politically-connected firms is significantly poorer 
than that of similar non-connected companies. Another effect of political economy on 
corporate governance is described by Pagano and Volpin (2005). They provide a model in 
which left governments implement laws that protect labor and right governments are more 
likely to favor governance and investor protection. Our theoretical model incorporates the 
double-agency problem introduced by Stulz (2005) and Desai et al. (2007). Stulz (2005) 
models the complementary relation between managerial diversion and state expropriation and 
discusses how state quality affects investment strategies and corporate ownership. Desai et al. 
(2007) show that stricter tax enforcement improves firm governance. Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006, 2009) investigate how firm governance interacts with firm incentives to use tax 
shelters and the impact of tax sheltering on firm valuation. In their models, sheltering raises 
shareholder wealth for firms with strong governance. Durnev et al. (2009) report that firms 
practice worse governance in countries with higher expropriation risk. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the resource curse. Sachs and Warner 
(1997) were first to show that the share of primary resources in exports negatively affects 
economic growth in standard growth regressions. Early studies have attributed this 
phenomenon to the macroeconomic “Dutch disease”: Krugman (1987) considers a model 
with dynamic economies of scale where the negative effect of resource abundance on the 
competitiveness of manufacturing sector may have long-term implications. However, more 
recent literature (Boschini et al. (2006), Caselli (2006), Hodler (2006), Mehlum et al. (2006), 
Robinson et al. (2006)) shows that the negative effect of resource abundance on growth is 
related to the deterioration of economic and political institutions. In particular, Mehlum et al. 
(2006) find that the average effect of natural resource abundance on growth is not robust. In 
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countries with mature institutions, natural resources have no significant impact on economic 
growth; if anything, the effect is positive. However, if institutions are underdeveloped, 
resource abundance negatively and significantly affects growth. Resource rents create 
incentives for the political elite to engage in rent-seeking rather than productive activities, 
and suppress the development of property rights, and of governmental checks and balances. 
This effect was documented in a seminal paper by Ross (2001), who showed that oil-rich 
countries tend to be less democratic. Tsui (2005) followed up on Ross’ cross-sectional results 
with a more sophisticated test. He instrumented oil abundance with unexpected discovery of 
oil and showed that oil abundance does reduce the level of democracy in a country in the 
subsequent 30 years. Using a panel of countries Egorov et al. (2009) show that controlling 
for country fixed effects, oil richness implies lower media freedom. Guriev et al. (2011) finds 
that nationalization of private oil companies is more likely in countries with imperfect 
political institutions, and when oil prices are high. Using the case of Russian oil export, 
Berkowitz and Semikolenova (2006) argue that an increase in tax revenue due to high oil 
prices enables governments to delay institutional reforms. The literature also identifies the 
human capital channel of the resource curse. Gylfason (2001) argues that natural resource 
abundance reduces incentives for accumulating human capital thus suppressing long-term 
growth rates. Suslova and Volchkova (2007) use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology 
(similar to the methodology used in this paper) to provide microeconomic evidence 
supporting this conjecture. Most of the empirical resource curse literature faces serious 
methodological problems (Treisman (2010)). As institutions change very slowly, the 
empirical analysis is generally conducted using cross-country Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions that are vulnerable to multiple biases. The few exceptions using the panel data 
and Instrumental Variables estimation include the abovementioned Tsui (2005), Egorov et al. 
(2009), and Suslova and Volchkova (2007). We contribute to this research stream using the 
Rajan-Zingales (1998) difference-in-difference methodology controlling for industry and 
country specifics; we also enhance the methodology by taking advantage of the time 
variation in the expropriation risk. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks  
We propose and examine a new channel through which expropriation risk can reduce 
economic growth through the deterioration of corporate transparency. We develop a model of 
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disclosure that incorporates the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, and the 
risk of expropriation by a government. The model predicts that firms subject to greater risks 
of expropriation can reduce this by becoming opaque and hiding profits. Lower corporate 
transparency, in turn, leads to inefficient capital allocation and hampers economic growth. 
For the empirical tests, we construct several proxies for opacity, income reducing 
strategies, earnings management, and information asymmetry. In order to test whether risk of 
expropriation results in lower transparency at the firm level, we use the difference-in-
difference approach. We identify industries that are more prone to expropriation and show 
that these industries are relatively less transparent in countries with higher risk of 
expropriation. We use three different measures of sensitivity to expropriation: oil 
dependence, human capital intensity, and the realized incidences of expropriation. 
Our results show that controlling for firm agency problems, as well as firm and year fixed 
effects, firms in oil-dependent industries or industries that rely less on skilled labor are less 
transparent. We also investigate the real impact of corporate opacity of expropriation-prone 
industries and find that the sensitivity of investment with respect to value as well as the rate 
of growth in sales are significantly lower in industries prone to expropriation in countries 
with weaker property rights. We document that the deterioration in efficiency of capital 
markets and firm growth results from both reduced transparency and the direct risks of 
expropriation.  
The results on expropriation risk of the oil industry also shed additional light on the 
consensus that slower growth in resource-rich economies may be explained by the negative 
impact of resource endowments on the development of economic and political institutions, 
which in turn suppresses economic growth. Our main contribution is empirical. Unlike the 
existing literature, which is mostly based on cross-country comparisons, we use a panel of 
firms spanning many years. We examine the effect of government predation on corporate 
transparency, capital allocation, and growth in resource industries at the microeconomic level 
controlling for agency problem, firm and time-specific effects.  
Our results show that the returns to transparency are reduced for industries with high 
expropriation risk operating in weak institutional environments. The policymakers should 
bear in mind that in such industries stricter disclosure laws only work in the presence of 
strong property rights, so the focus should be on reducing the risk of the expropriation which 
will in turn bring higher transparency, efficient capital allocation, and growth.  
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Table I 
Risk of expropriation and opacity of expropriation-sensitive companies: The difference-in-differences 
approach. 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions with aggregate opacity as the dependent variable. Aggregate opacity index is calculated using the Principal Component 
Analysis with the following weights: 0.677 for accounting opacity, 0.362 for informational opacity, and 0.641 for insider opacity. The independent variables are: 
interaction term of industry expropriation sensitivity (oil dependence, human capital, expropriation instances, and unified expropriation sensitivity) with country risk of 
expropriation (double interaction), country risk of expropriation, industry unified expropriation sensitivity, firm ownership wedge (difference between control rights and 
cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder), industry external financing need, interaction of industry external financing need with country risk of expropriation, 
interaction of industry unified expropriation risk with country GDP per capita, interaction of unified expropriation risk with country rule of law, country effective 
corporate tax rate, country burden of taxation, firm cross-listing dummy variable, country financial development, country GDP per capita, country rule of law, firm 
growth opportunities, firm size, and volatility of fundamentals. The unified expropriation sensitivity is calculated using the Principal Component Analysis with the 
following weights: 0.571 for oil dependence, -0.470 for human capital, and 0.672 for expropriation instances. All of the coefficients are multiplied by 100. Regressions 
include firm and year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients 
significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. Firms from the U.S. and firms that experienced expropriation are dropped from the 
sample. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and they are clustered by firm.  
dependent variable aggregate opacity 
expropriation sensitivity oil dependence human capital 
expropriation 
instances 
unified 
expropriation 
sensitivity 
expropriation sensitivity × risk of expropriation 0.716 -1.043 0.257 0.784 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
risk of expropriation 0.034 0.042 0.027 0.051 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) 
expropriation sensitivity 0.013 -0.021 0.019 0.069 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) 
ownership wedge 0.057 0.063 0.083 0.098 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) 
industry external financing need -0.396 -0.108 -0.218 -0.032 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) 
external financing need × risk of expropriation  -0.458 -0.357 -0.391 -0.487 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
expropriation sens. × GDP per capita   -0.005 0.004 0.005 0.031 
 (0.24) (0.18) (0.53) (0.20) 
expropriation sens. × rule of law -0.068 -0.028 -0.017 -0.007 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) 
effective corporate tax 0.124 0.121 0.188 0.170 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) 
tax burden 0.161 0.222 0.180 0.140 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
cross-listing dummy -0.055 -0.097 -0.067 -0.038 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) 
financial development -0.015 -0.032 -0.015 0.007 
 (0.22) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) 
GDP per capita -0.004 -0.012 -0.020 0.005 
 (0.39) (0.21) (0.36) (0.30) 
rule of law -0.052 -0.073 -0.056 -0.053 
 (0.30) (0.14) (0.67) (0.33) 
firm growth opportunities 1.167 1.318 1.379 1.508 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
firm size  0.027 0.018 0.025 0.032 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.09) (0.05) 
volatility of fundamentals 0.278 0.256 0.241 0.211 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
firm fixed effects included included included Included 
year fixed effects  included included included Included 
R2 0.352 0.314 0.339 0.380 
number of observations 78,835 78,835 78,835 78,835 
number of countries 65 65 65 65 
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Table II 
Risk of expropriation and opacity attributes of expropriation-sensitive companies: The difference-in-
difference approach. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions with income reducing accruals, accounting opacity, informational opacity, and insider opacity as dependent 
variables. The independent variables are: interaction term of industry unified expropriation sensitivity with country risk of expropriation (double interaction), country 
risk of expropriation, industry unified expropriation sensitivity, firm ownership wedge (difference between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate 
shareholder), industry external financing need, interaction of industry external financing need with country risk of expropriation, interaction of industry unified 
expropriation risk with country GDP per capita, interaction of unified expropriation risk with country rule of law, country effective corporate tax rate, country burden 
of taxation, firm cross-listing dummy variable, country financial development, country GDP per capita, country rule of law, firm growth opportunities, firm size, and 
volatility of fundamentals (for specifications with income reducing accruals, accounting opacity and aggregate opacity as dependent variables). The unified 
expropriation sensitivity is calculated using the Principal Component Analysis with the following weights: 0.571 for oil dependence, -0.470 for human capital, and 
0.672 for expropriation instance. All of the coefficients are multiplied by 100. Regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are 
probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in 
bold face. Firms from the U.S. and firms that experienced expropriations are dropped from the sample. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and they are 
clustered by firm.  
 
dependent variable 
income 
reducing 
discretionary 
accruals 
accounting 
opacity 
informational 
opacity 
insider 
opacity 
unified expropriation sensitivity × risk of expropriation 0.519 0.696 0.592 0.114 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) 
risk of expropriation 0.032 0.045 0.029 0.031 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.21) (0.10) 
unified expropriation sensitivity 0.139 0.064 0.021 0.068 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) 
ownership wedge 0.051 0.020 0.044 0.212 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.00) 
industry external financing need -0.064 -0.035 0.009 -0.052 
 (0.21) (0.14) (0.36) (0.20) 
external financing need × risk of expropriation -0.255 -0.334 -0.443 -0.186 
 (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × GDP per capita  0.045 0.012 0.056 -0.014 
 (0.25) (0.13) (0.21) (0.25) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × rule of law -0.009 -0.017 -0.009 0.025 
 (0.14) (0.51) (0.44) (0.31) 
effective corporate tax rate 0.154 0.115 0.171 0.051 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.10) 
tax burden 0.173 0.112 0.118 0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
cross-listing dummy 0.012 -0.028 -0.013 -0.048 
 (0.33) (0.10) (0.03) (0.14) 
financial development -0.006 -0.002 -0.012 0.047 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.14) (0.23) 
GDP per capita -0.006 0.012 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.41) (0.62) 
rule of law -0.252 -0.063 0.017 -0.078 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.43) (0.50) 
firm growth opportunities 0.708 1.625 0.670 0.657 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
firm size -0.050 -0.078 0.012 0.031 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) 
volatility of fundamentals 0.164 0.184 - - 
 (0.00) (0.00)   
firm fixed effects included included included included 
year fixed effects included included included included 
R2 0.340 0.334 0.381 0.387 
number of observations 79,817 79,817 78,835 78,835
number of countries 84 84 65 65 
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Table III 
Risk of expropriation and opacity of oil and gas companies: Triple-difference approach. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions with income reducing accruals, accounting opacity, insider opacity, informational opacity, and aggregate opacity as 
dependent variables. Aggregate opacity is calculated using the Principal Component Analysis with the following weights: 0.677 for accounting opacity, 0.362 for 
informational opacity, and 0.641 for insider opacity The independent variables are: interaction term of oil and gas industry dummy variable with country risk of 
expropriation and the log of real oil price (triple interaction), oil and gas industry dummy variable with country risk of expropriation (double interaction), the log of 
real oil price with country risk of expropriation (double interaction), oil and gas industry dummy variable with the log of real price (double interactions), country risk 
of expropriation, firm ownership wedge (difference between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder), industry external financing need, 
interaction of industry external financing need with country risk of expropriation, interaction of industry unified expropriation sensitivity with country GDP per 
capita, interaction of unified expropriation sensitivity with country rule of law, country effective corporate tax rate, country burden of taxation, firm cross-listing 
dummy variable, country financial development, country GDP per capita, country rule of law, firm growth opportunities, firm size, and volatility of fundamentals 
(for specifications with income reducing accruals, accounting opacity and aggregate opacity as dependent variables). All of the coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
Regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The 
coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. Firms from the U.S. and firms that experienced expropriations are 
dropped from the sample. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and they are clustered by firms.  
 
dependent variable 
income reducing 
discretionary 
accruals 
accounting 
opacity 
informational 
opacity 
insider 
opacity 
aggregate 
opacity 
oil and gas industry × oil price × risk of  
expropriation 
0.711 1.186 0.840 0.095 0.875 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) 
oil and gas industry × risk of expropriation 0.037 0.081 -0.014 0.036 0.052 
  (0.00) (0.10) (0.16) (0.00) (0.10) 
oil price × risk of expropriation -0.280 -0.004 0.186 -0.006 0.089 
  (0.54) (0.24) (0.20) (0.36) (0.22) 
oil and gas industry × oil price -0.002 -0.038 0.007 -0.069 -0.140 
  (0.63) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
risk of expropriation 0.024 0.058 0.039 0.036 0.065 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.21) (0.10) (0.11) 
ownership wedge 0.044 0.039 0.038 0.046 0.056 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.00) (0.02) 
industry external financing need -0.056 -0.367 0.017 0.005 -0.210 
 (0.21) (0.13) (0.39) (0.21) (0.10) 
external financing need × risk of expropriation  -0.156 -0.331 -0.424 -0.394 -0.529 
 (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
oil and gas industry × GDP per capita   0.029 0.037 0.046 -0.019 0.040 
 (0.25) (0.13) (0.21) (0.25) (0.20) 
oil and gas industry × rule of law -0.008 0.001 -0.015 0.025 0.001 
 (0.14) (0.51) (0.44) (0.29) (018) 
effective corporate tax 0.149 0.123 0.176 0.070 0.183 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.23) (0.11) (0.14) 
tax burden 0.155 0.095 0.128 0.155 0.168 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
cross-listing dummy 0.031 -0.024 -0.024 -0.030 -0.035 
 (0.33) (0.10) (0.03) (0.16) (0.10) 
financial development -0.005 0.018 0.005 -0.028 0.005 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) 
GDP per capita -0.011 -0.002 0.025 0.004 0.013 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.48) (0.68) (0.34) 
rule of law -0.270 -0.278 0.003 0.014 -0.161 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.43) (0.50) (0.30) 
firm growth opportunities 0.695 0.618 0.665 0.639 0.895 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
firm size  -0.060 -0.066 0.014 0.027 -0.025 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
volatility of fundamentals 0.160 0.188 - - 0.222 
 (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) 
firm fixed effects included included included included Included 
year fixed effects  included included included included Included 
R2 0.380 0.334 0.380 0.387 0.340 
number of observations 79,817 79,817 78,835 78,835 78,835
number of countries 84 84 65 65 65 
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Table IV 
Sensitivity measures based on various commodities prices. 
 
This table reports the results of regressions in Table I with aggregate opacity as the dependent variable and using various industrial commodity 
sensitivities measures (metals, raw industrial materials, textiles, foods, fats, livestock, and composite) in place of industry oil dependence. The 
sensitivity measures are constructed using equation (8) by regressing industry valuation on the logarithm of corresponding commodity price 
index, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The reported coefficients and p-values are for the double interaction term of the sensitivity of 
industry profits to corresponding commodity index price with country risk of expropriation. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The first row 
replicates the results of Table I.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  oil 0.716
  (0.00) 
co
m
m
od
ity
 in
de
x 
metals 0.611
(0.00) 
raw industrial materials 0.403
(0.00) 
textiles 0.010 
(0.32) 
foods 0.090 
(0.26) 
fats -0.117 
(0.14) 
livestock 0.111 
(0.20) 
composite (excluding oil) 0.207
(0.05) 
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Table V 
Firm growth and industry capital allocation efficiency of expropriation-sensitive industries 
conditional on risk of expropriation. Difference-in-difference approach. 
This table reports the results of the OLS regressions of firm growth (Panel A) and industry capital allocation efficiency (Panel B) as dependent variables. The 
independent variables are: firm opacity gap, interaction term of industry unified expropriation sensitivity with country risk of expropriation (double interaction), 
industry external financing need with country financial development, industry intensity of intangibles with country risk of expropriation, industry oil-price-
dependence with country GDP per capita, industry oil-price-dependence with country rule of law, country risk of expropriation, country financial development, 
country GDP per capita, country rule of law, firm growth opportunities, firm size, industry oil-price-dependence, industry external financing need, and industry 
intangibles intensity. Opacity gap is defined as the difference between opacity level of a sample firm and a matched firm in the U.S, matched by two-digit industry 
SIC code, firm size, and firm growth opportunities. Regressions in Panel A include firm and year fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include industry and 
country fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 
10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. Firms from the U.S. and firms that experienced expropriations are dropped from the sample. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and they are clustered by firms (in Panel A) and industries (in Panel B).  
dependent variable Panel A : growth in firm sales Panel B: industry capital allocation 
opacity gap -0.028 -0.060 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × risk of  expropriation -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.03) (0.08) 
risk of expropriation -0.136 - 
 (0.00)  
unified expropriation sensitivity -0.211 - 
 (0.16)  
ownership wedge -0.314 -0.023 
 (0.14) (0.21) 
external financing need 0.027 - 
 (0.10)  
external financing need × risk of expropriation 0.613 0.208 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
intangibles intensity 0.173 - 
 (0.29)  
intangibles intensity × risk of expropriation 0.007 -0.020 
  (0.40) (0.01) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × GDP per capita  0.021 0.214 
 (0.12) (0.07) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × rule of law 0.402 0.120 
 (0.00) (0.20) 
effective corporate tax -0.033 -0.3231 
 (0.16) (0.08) 
tax burden -0.039 -0.138 
 (0.05) (0.03) 
external financing need × financial development 0.606 0.129 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
cross-listing dummy 0.004 - 
 (0.00)  
risk of expropriation -0.161 - 
 (0.00)  
financial development 0.347 - 
 (0.10)  
GDP per capita 0.001 - 
 (0.01)  
rule of law 0.028 - 
 (0.00)  
firm growth opportunities 0.816 - 
 (0.00)  
firm size -0.042 - 
 (0.00)  
firm fixed effects included not included 
industry fixed effects not included included 
country fixed effects not included Included 
year fixed effects included included 
R2 0.208 0.223 
number of observations 79,817 818 
number of countries 84 72 
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Table VI 
Expropriation risk vs. government collusion hypotheses: Tests conditional on state ownership. 
 
This table reports regressions conditional on state ownership. The specification used is as in the last column of Table III, run on the subsamples of 
firms without government ownership (Panel A) and with government ownership (Panel B). There are 1,815 firms (8,893 firm-year observations) with 
non-zero government ownership. To conduct the Wald-test of coefficient equivalence, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has non-zero 
government ownership, and 0 otherwise. We multiply every independent variable by the corresponding dummy variables and include them in the 
regressions.  The Wald-test of coefficient equivalence (reported at the bottom of the table) is an F-test of joint significance of the interaction terms with 
the dummy variables. The null hypothesis is that the relation between the dependent variable and independent variables does not change across the two 
samples. 
 
 
Panel A: firms without state 
ownership 
Panel B: firms with state 
ownership 
dependent variable aggregate opacity 
unified expropriation sensitivity × risk of 
expropriation 0.775 -0.144 
  (0.00) (0.42) 
risk of expropriation 0.056 0.073 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
unified expropriation sensitivity 0.072 0.099 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
ownership wedge 0.116 0.130 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
industry external financing need -0.031 -0.371 
 (0.10) (0.18) 
external financing need × risk of expropriation -0.417 -0.176 
 (0.00) (0.20) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × GDP per capita  0.025 -0.030 
 (0.20) (0.12) 
unified expropriation sensitivity × rule of law -0.006 -0.032 
 (0.14) (0.29) 
effective corporate tax 0.163 0.090 
 (0.12) (0.16) 
tax burden 0.120 0.080 
 (0.00) (0.17) 
cross-listing dummy -0.034 -0.098 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
financial development 0.010 -0.004 
 (0.22) (0.28) 
GDP per capita 0.007 -0.597 
 (0.24) (0.10) 
rule of law -0.094 -0.068 
 (0.10) (0.13) 
firm growth opportunities 1.318 1.219 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
firm size 0.030 0.018 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
volatility of fundamentals 0.210 0.258 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
firm fixed effects included included 
year fixed effects included included 
R2 0.382 0.414 
Wald test of coefficient equivalence (F-test) 
318.660 
(0.00) 
number of observations 70,924 8,893 
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Appendix 
 
Panel A: Expropriation sensitivities by industry.  
 
This table contains summary statistics of expropriation sensitivities: oil dependence, human capital, and the number of observed expropriations. Oil 
dependence is defined as a coefficient j on the natural logarithm of oil price in a regression of industry inflation-adjusted valuation on time trend and log of 
real oil price,   jtoiltjjjjt PtQ   ln  , where Q is the median industry valuation (inflation-adjusted using Producer Price Index),  a constant, t time 
trend, and Poil inflation-adjusted price of oil. Human capital is the proportion of labor with an advanced college degree using data from the 1995-2007 Current 
Population Survey (Wang (2010)). Observed expropriations is the number of expropriation instances in the sample countries occurred during the period from 
1950 through 2007. We use Lexis-Nexis to conduct the search using the following words: “nationalization”, “expropriation”, “forced sale”, and “forced 
ownership transfer.” The unified expropriation sensitivity is calculated using the Principal Component Analysis with the following weights: 0.571 for oil 
dependence, -0.470 for human capital, and 0.672 for expropriation instance. The index is converted to the 0-to-1 scale. The pairwise correlations are: -0.141 
between oil dependence and human capital (p-val = 0.33); 0.450 between oil dependence and expropriations (p-val = 0.00); and -0.290 between human capital 
and expropriation instances (p-val = 0.04).  
 
SIC industry oil dependence human capital 
expropriation 
instances 
unified expr. 
sensitivity 
200 Agriculture -0.206 0.121 0 0.269 
800 Forestry -0.913 0.089 0 0.117 
900 Fishing, hunting, and trapping 0.136 0.097 0 0.369 
1000 Metal Mining 0.666 0.108 1 0.599 
1200 Coal Mining 0.475 0.105 1 0.554 
1300 Oil And Gas Extraction 0.774 0.192 5 1.000 
1400 Mining Of Nonmetallic Minerals 0.414 0.120 1 0.529 
1500 Building Construction -0.135 0.075 2 0.532 
2000 Food And Kindred Products 0.333 0.229 0 0.329 
2100 Tobacco Products 0.401 0.081 2 0.660 
2200 Textile Mill Products 0.049 0.121 1 0.439 
2300 Apparel And Other Finished Products -0.207 0.102 0 0.281 
2400 Lumber And Wood 0.263 0.178 1 0.454 
2600 Paper And Allied Products 0.456 0.089 1 0.560 
2700 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 0.355 0.206 0 0.350 
2800 Chemicals And Allied Products -0.151 0.171 0 0.249 
2900 Petroleum Refining 0.950 0.190 1 0.614 
3000 Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products -0.188 0.206 0 0.217 
3100 Leather And Leather Products -0.221 0.199 0 0.213 
3200 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete 0.333 0.173 1 0.474 
3300 Primary Metal Industries 0.109 0.206 1 0.397 
3500  Machinery -0.06 0.189 0 0.259 
3600 Electronic Equipment -0.486 0.208 0 0.142 
3700 Transportation Equipment -0.028 0.186 0 0.269 
3800 Measuring Instruments -0.253 0.201 0 0.204 
4000 Railroad Transportation -0.107 0.147 1 0.383 
4200 Motor Freight Transportation -0.103 0.148 1 0.384 
4400 Water Transportation -0.180 0.140 1 0.370 
4500 Transportation By Air -0.796 0.124 1 0.230 
4600 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 0.410 0.118 2 0.637 
4700 Transportation Services -0.445 0.131 1 0.311 
4800 Communications -0.051 0.187 1 0.371 
4900 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services -0.08 0.216 0 0.237 
5000 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods -0.183 0.118 0 0.277 
5200 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply 0.359 0.124 1 0.513 
5500 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Stations 0.214 0.132 0 0.365 
6000 Depository Institutions -0.022 0.399 0 0.129 
6200 Security And Commodity Brokers -0.282 0.403 0 0.063 
6400 Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service -0.173 0.380 0 0.105 
6500 Real Estate -0.032 0.379 0 0.140 
6700 Holding And Other Investment Offices -0.025 0.406 0 0.124 
7000 Hotels, Rooming Houses 0.341 0.111 2 0.625 
7300 Business Services -0.172 0.141 0 0.264 
7500 Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 0.273 0.137 0 0.376 
8000 Health Services -0.198 0.305 1 0.256 
8100 Legal Services 0.084 0.173 0 0.305 
8200 Educational Services -0.134 0.552 0 0.000 
8300 Social Services 0.273 0.201 0 0.333 
8700 Engineering And Related Services -0.148 0.142 0 0.269 
average  0.034 0.187 0.612 0.350 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics by country, 1995-2007. 
 
This table contains summary statistics of the opacity sample by country (average values across firms and years). The variables are: oil reserves (in billions of barrels), 
number of firms, number of firm-years, number of oil companies, country risk of expropriation, income reducing accruals, accounting opacity, informational opacity, 
insider opacity, and aggregate opacity. Oil reserves statistics are from the 2008 BP Statistical Review. U.S. is dropped from the sample. The sample years are 1995-2007. 
The aggregate opacity index is calculated using the Principal Component Analysis with the following weights: 0.677 for accounting opacity, 0.641 for insider opacity, 
and 0.362 for informational opacity. The index is converted to the 0-to-1 scale.   
country 
oil 
reserves, 
billions 
barrels 
number of 
firms 
number of 
firm-years 
number of oil 
firms 
risk of 
expropriation 
income 
decreasing 
accruals 
accounting 
opacity 
informational 
opacity 
insider 
opacity 
aggregate 
opacity 
Algeria 10.154 10 33 4 4.500  0.082 0.308 - - - 
Argentina 2.39 113 728 12 5.593 -0.039 0.269 -0.457 0.085 0.603 
Australia 3.649 452 2,644 94 2.282 -0.063 0.091 -0.158 -0.017 0.297 
Austria - 69 348 4 1.827 0.045 0.372 -1.544 0.015 0.554 
Bahrain - 14 44 4 2.298 0.016 0.218 - - - 
Bangladesh - 7 29 - 5.878 0.066 0.187 -1.552 0.006 0.305 
Belgium - 102 379 - 2.010 -0.128 0.064 -1.637 0.027 0.159 
Bolivia - 16 115 6 4.131 0.038 0.167 - - - 
Brazil 5.942 463 3,140 - 5.212 0.051 0.113 -0.882 0.019 0.290 
Bulgaria - 14 42 - 2.170 0.001 0.121 -0.252 -0.017 0.326 
Canada 13.572 1,282 5,934 131 1.917 -0.122 0.028 -1.647 -0.011 0.072 
Chile - 218 1,373 6 2.032 0.055 0.106 -1.633 -0.031 0.153 
China 16.061 1,108 6,487 21 4.801 0.121 0.272 -0.663 0.069 0.570 
Colombia 1.848 86 259 6 5.058 0.054 0.195 -0.857 -0.010 0.368 
Croatia - 29 37 - 3.372 0.036 0.082 -0.950 0.063 0.289 
Cyprus - 10 65 4 1.769 0.026 0.085 -1.747 0.057 0.207 
Czech Rep. - 65 244 6 2.240 0.047 0.124 -1.803 0.047 0.241 
Denmark 0.791 85 365 2 2.269 0.005 0.004 -2.075 -0.009 0.000 
Ecuador 2.930 15 20 4 6.538 0.051 0.156 - - - 
Egypt 3.780 73 139 6 4.394 0.069 0.144 - - - 
Estonia - 16 18 - 2.136 0.081 0.116 - - - 
Finland - 55 271 2 1.756 0.072 0.058 -0.331 -0.016 0.238 
France - 700 3,550 - 1.821 0.003 0.091 -1.497 0.031 0.212 
Germany - 605 3,186 6 1.901 -0.096 0.073 -1.594 -0.008 0.139 
Greece - 184 999 4 2.410 0.098 0.092 -0.310 -0.007 0.294 
Guatemala - 10 17 2 3.029 0.032 0.106 - - - 
Honduras - 10 18 - 4.545 0.126 0.119 - - - 
Hong Kong - 140 862 4 2.378 0.088 0.076 -1.536 0.059 0.218 
Hungary - 13 29 2 1.929 0.163 0.130 -1.374 -0.005 0.237 
India 4.991 454 799 45 4.708 0.018 0.112 -0.824 0.049 0.326 
Indonesia 6.535 71 319 8 5.753 0.116 0.135 -0.828 0.229 0.544 
Ireland - 63 389 11 1.545 0.056 0.132 -1.631 0.125 0.350 
Israel - 111 666 6 3.433 0.082 0.157 -0.894 0.003 0.329 
Italy 0.716 219 1,187 8 2.125 0.324 0.143 -1.210 0.107 0.388 
Japan - 1,858 9,990 - 2.756 0.169 0.079 -1.160 0.139 0.344 
Jordan - 80 104 6 2.881 0.093 0.067 - - - 
Kazakhstan 35.302 12 12 4 3.596 0.068 0.147 -0.781 0.202 0.536 
Kenya - 17 37 3 4.231 0.052 0.162 - - - 
Korea - 1,087 7,016 18 3.657 0.084 0.119 -1.283 0.168 0.413 
Kuwait 92.704 59 131 8 3.372 0.074 0.079 -0.809 0.243 0.488 
Latvia - 26 49 2 2.096 0.041 0.088 - - - 
Lithuania - 35 68 4 2.119 0.026 0.090 - - - 
Malaysia 4.156 296 1,364 12 3.984 0.102 0.107 -1.059 -0.004 0.241 
Mexico 39.723 129 784 2 2.721 0.056 0.182 -0.763 0.246 0.629 
Morocco - 31 76 4 3.660 0.000 0.084 -0.964 -0.025 0.198 
Netherlands - 117 316 6 1.484 -0.031 0.051 -2.104 0.035 0.104 
New Zealand - 57 285 6 1.939 -0.075 0.052 -1.676 0.017 0.129 
Nicaragua - 12 29 2 5.112 0.135 0.129 - - - 
Nigeria 23.304 21 54 6 6.801 -0.038 0.120 -0.452 0.193 0.524 
Norway 8.425 102 329 - 2.285 0.054 0.033 -1.820 0.195 0.276 
Oman 4.742 43 105 6 3.019 0.026 0.140 - - - 
Pakistan - 82 256 16 6.638 -0.015 0.232 -0.828 0.209 0.648 
Panama - 20 50 4 3.051 0.066 0.182 -0.347 0.147 0.567 
Paraguay - 41 55 4 3.952 0.003 0.112 - - - 
Peru 0.834 184 431 6 4.022 -0.006 0.177 -0.372 0.072 0.480 
Philippines - 199 893 43 3.535 0.056 0.169 -0.473 -0.015 0.368 
Poland - 77 129 8 1.907 0.071 0.126 -0.726 0.113 0.421 
Portugal - 66 321 3 1.484 -0.100 0.104 -1.877 0.075 0.237 
Qatar 10.216 20 47 6 2.782 0.119 0.140 -0.435 0.024 0.375 
Romania 1.052 12 29 - 4.010 0.058 0.102 -0.814 0.036 0.301 
Russia 70.371 209 426 - 5.128 0.072 0.493 -1.611 0.299 1.000 
Saudi Arabia 235.347 70 204 4 3.013 0.174 0.083 -1.106 0.079 0.292 
Serbia - 13 13 - 4.500 0.086 0.319 -1.210 0.159 0.669 
Singapore - 403 2,098 - 1.449 0.059 0.078 -1.610 0.018 0.171 
Slovakia - 10 16 2 2.436 -0.039 0.054 -0.832 0.005 0.204 
Slovenia - 11 22 2 1.583 0.090 0.155 -0.258 -0.019 0.368 
South Africa - 221 1,217 2 2.692 0.072 0.115 -0.427 -0.037 0.280 
Spain - 209 1,176 6 1.404 -0.032 0.060 -2.094 0.037 0.118 
Sri Lanka - 60 377 - 4.356 0.020 0.112 -0.691 -0.013 0.275 
Sweden - 420 2,671 18 2.304 -0.121 0.059 -1.018 0.070 0.260 
Switzerland - 171 493 2 2.734 0.066 0.077 -1.274 0.092 0.281 
Syria 2.252 11 25 6 6.176 0.049 0.082 - - - 
Taiwan - 428 2,652 10 1.849 0.049 0.063 -1.349 -0.011 0.147 
Thailand 0.316 400 2,109 16 4.391 -0.030 0.160 -1.608 0.171 0.437 
Tunisia 1.064 34 57 - 3.551 -0.026 0.086 -0.327 0.034 0.327 
Turkey - 132 632 6 4.500 -0.004 0.147 -0.286 -0.002 0.372 
Uganda - 10 21 - 3.782 0.093 0.153 - - - 
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Ukraine - 13 45 2 5.991 0.075 0.122 -0.781 0.315 0.621 
United Arab 
Emirates 83.803 46 147 6 2.955 0.034 0.198 -1.647 0.008 0.311 
United 
Kingdom 5.015 1,613 7,364 130 1.256 -0.009 0.062 -1.912 -0.071 0.026 
Uruguay - 18 50 - 2.631 -0.003 0.332 - - - 
Venezuela 61.749 30 92 5 7.580 0.014 0.079 -0.221 0.162 0.462 
Vietnam 1.579 130 180 4 4.958 0.053 0.150 -0.763 0.332 0.677 
Zambia - 13 35 - 4.744 0.061 0.349 - - - 
average 22.215 193 950 12 3.367 0.041 0.135 -1.072 0.070 0.343 
total 755.313 16,240 79,817 808       
